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Several interrelated drivers of illicit crop cultivation appear remarkably consistent across 
virtually all illegal crop producing regions: insurgency or armed conflict, insufficient 
state authority and weak territorial control, a climate of instability, poverty and food 
insecurity, remoteness and a lack of infrastructure and development.  This research paper 
argues that the enduring success of illicit crop reduction and drug supply control efforts 
in a given area depends on the extent to which these environmental factors are mitigated 
or eliminated.  The work further proposes that properly designed, carefully coordinated, 
and consistently funded alternative development (AD) programs have demonstrated the 
greatest promise for dramatically altering the primary drivers underlying illegal drug crop 
cultivation.  By contrast, it contends that forced crop eradication without the prior 
establishment of effective AD can and has often resulted in dramatic short-term 
reductions in drug crop yields while exacerbating the fundamental causes of illicit 
cultivation.  The research employs two case-oriented methods of qualitative analysis.  
First, a within-case method of process tracing is used, followed by a method of 
comparative analysis between the three case studies: Thailand and Laos in Southeast 
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                                                   Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
     Human use of intoxicants and mind-altering substances dates back to the prehistoric 
era, as far back as the Stone Age.  Excavated artifacts of drug paraphernalia and DNA 
hair samples have confirmed this fact.
1
  Man’s non-medicinal use of various plant-based 
psychoactive drugs was also recorded very early in the historical period, and such drug 
use has probably existed in most cultures from antiquity to the modern age.  In addition 
to recreational usage, throughout the centuries drugs have been formally employed as an 
adjunct to cultural rites and religious rituals in many cultures.   
     Regardless of the circumstances however, drugs have historically been governed by 
strict protocols and laws in most societies.
2
  Therefore, throughout most of human 
history, a wide variety of drugs have not been readily available to the masses for 
recreational use.  But as industrial capitalism evolved in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and technological advances were achieved, mass production and increased global 
commerce enabled enormous stockpiles of drugs to be disseminated to demanding 
populations around the world.   
     In the twentieth century, producers developed an endless array of consumer goods and 
effectively exploited new sophisticated advertising and marketing techniques to create 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan Wynne-Jones, “Stone Age man took drugs, say scientists,” The Telegraph, 








widespread demand for their products.  Modern commodity consumerism steadily 
engulfed the globe.  These unprecedented events presaged the advent of popular 
recreational drug use as a worldwide phenomenon, as more and more goods became 




    Opium is a drug that has been used in various cultures for millennia, from the ancient 
Babylonian civilization of Sumer, to the Assyrians and the Egyptians, the Greeks and the 
Romans.  In recent centuries, opium use has periodically flourished in niche cultures 
throughout much of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, often creating sizable 
populations of addicts.
4
  As a result of Britain’s notorious Opium Wars of 1839 and 1856, 
the Chinese government was coerced into allowing regular massive shipments of foreign 
opium to flood the country, steadily inundating the population.
5
  As a result of this 
malign trade, and the enormous quantities of opium the state was eventually obliged to 
produce in order to supply runaway demand, their society was burdened with about 13.5 
million suffering addicts by 1906.  This number was approximately equivalent to a 
devastating 27 percent of their adult male population.
6
       
                                                 
3
 Toby Seddon, A History of Drugs, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2010), 130-132. 
 
4
 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of Poppy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1-7.  
 
5
 Ibid., 104. 
 
6
 Afred W. McCoy, “Coercion and its Unintended Consequences: A Study of Trafficking 
in Southeast and South West Asia,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, No.33 (2000), 198.  
Note: McCoy observes that in 1906, China imported about 4,000 tons of opium, and 
domestically produced 35,000 tons.  In this peak year, their harvest was tantamount to 
Japan’s 31,000 ton tea trade, or Brazil’s 39,000 ton cocoa production.  
 
 3 
     Repeatedly, around the world, problems of addiction increased with successive 
syntheses of opium into powerfully concentrated opiate derivatives.  Often, these new 
products rapidly proliferated around the world causing severe societal damage before 
possible ramifications could even be conceived of, let alone prepared for or prevented.  
For example, addiction to opiates soared in the United States during and after the carnage 
of the Civil War, when they were prescribed routinely for the alleviation of pain, 
resulting in thousands of addicts, north and south.
7
  
     Originally synthesized by Englishman C. R. Wright in 1874, Heinrich Dreser began 
production of diacetylmorphine, or heroin, for The Bayer Company labs in Germany in 
1895 after discovering that its use did not produce some of the common side effects of 
morphine.
8
  Based on the qualified validity of those observations, a few years later the 
new drug was commercially marketed in the US with the tragically exaggerated claim 
that it was a “safe, non-addictive” alternative to morphine.”  This promise immediately 
attracted scores of desperate morphine addicts and doctors alike.
9
 
     The US Congress assumed more active control over the manufacture and sale of 
opiates with the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906, and the Harrison Narcotics Act in 
1914.
10
  But the government had been regrettably slow to respond to years of steadily 
growing drug addiction in the country, and by 1925 there were an estimated 200,000 
                                                 
7








 “History of Heroin,” Narconon International. 
 
10
 “Opium Throughout History,” Frontline.   
 
 4 
narcotics addicts in the US.
11
  By this time, many people had also acquired an addiction 
to opiates through the use of commercial “cure-alls” containing laudanum.  These alleged 
medicinals were widely marketed for years and consumed by rich and poor, young and 
old.  
 
    Cocaine was synthesized from the leaves of the coca bush at about the same time as 
morphine was introduced to the US, in 1855.
12
  Over the next several decades cocaine 
use, in the form of tonics and elixirs, became very popular at all levels of society in the 
US, especially after John Pemberton added cocaine to the recipe for his ubiquitous soft 
drink, Coca Cola.  As with opiates, by the time congress added cocaine to the list of drugs 
regulated by the Dangerous Drug Act in 1925, there were legions of addicts suffering 




     Of course, this is a historical account of only one country’s original relationship with 
these drugs.  Other countries have had their own distinctive experiences regarding the use 
or production of opiates and cocaine, tempered by specific cultural and political 
influences.  However, the US experience is uniquely important because of the status and 
power that the United States wields in international affairs and the dominant position the 
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 “History of Heroin,” Narconon International.  . 
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US government has assumed in the crafting and enforcement of a global prohibition 
regime.   
     So too, Americans’ appetite for illicit drugs has been consistently robust, and therefore 
a prime focus of US law enforcement, politicians, and policymakers, who have pressed 
their agendas on the world stage. This has been especially true since the surge of 
recreational drug use in the 1960s.  
     An important part of Richard Nixon’s “War on Drugs” in 1971 was the heavy political 
pressure exerted on the government of Turkey to crack down on their domestic opium 
production, officially alleged to be the primary source of the heroin flooding the US 
market at that time.  In more recent years, since the era of skyrocketing cocaine use 
during the administration of Ronald Reagan, policy has been even more intensely focused 
on supply reduction and supply control, or “supply side” solutions to the problem of 
illegal drugs. 
     Since Reagan, many billions of dollars have been allocated to foreign governments to 
eradicate illicit crops and suppress drug production.  Much of this aid has been sent in the 
form of military hardware, in a pronounced “militarization” of the “War on Drugs.”
14
                                                                                                                          
 
     Militarized crop eradications and patrolling operations in Latin America have 
characterized the “Drug War” in recent times.  Such conduct has been effectively 
encouraged by a rigid “certification” process to verify compliance with US requirements 
concerning a nation’s anti-drug efforts.  This process has made many foreign 
governments eager to please in order to maintain good relations and sustain large sums of 
                                                 
14
 “Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, a Chronology,” Frontline.  Accessed 4-22-14, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/. 
 6 
US aid money.  This type of coerced compliance, and the predominant promotion of 
summarily suppressive military action and other prohibitionist tactics, orchestrated by the 
US and sanctioned by the UN, are at issue in much of the current discussion of the “War 
on Drugs” and international anti-drug policy. 
 
     Throughout history, there have always been ambitious entrepreneurs willing to break 
the law and risk trafficking in proscribed goods in exchange for handsome profits on the 
black market.  There have also always been requisite supportive networks comprised of 
producers, middlemen, and retailers of illegal wares.  However, since the revolutions in 
information and communications in the 1980s, along with contemporaneous evolutions in 
transportation and banking, criminal organizations involved in illegal trafficking have 
mushroomed almost beyond recognition in number, scale and sophistication.
15
   
     The ominous ascendancy of transnational crime, along with the spawning of new 
populations of addicts, has made illicit crop reduction and drug supply control an official 
priority around the world in recent decades.  There have been some enduring successes, 
yet in so many cases, crop eradication and other drug suppression initiatives have failed 
to achieve their ultimate purpose.   
     The reasons for particular outcomes in endeavors of this type are immensely 
complicated, and a clear understanding of the pertinent dynamics requires very detailed 
examination and analysis.  However, I believe that additional research and analysis across 
a large number of cases could serve to identify the common causal variables at play in 
alternately successful and failed drug control efforts.  This is why I am proposing the 
                                                 
15
 Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the 
Global Economy (New York, NY: Anchor Books,2005). 
 7 
following question for research: What factors most influence the success or failure of 




     There are two main reasons why this important question needs to be addressed, and 
the sooner the better.  Firstly, the sale of illicit drugs around the world annually nets 
hundreds of billions of dollars for violent transnational criminal organizations, many of 
which are also involved in other odious activities.  Commonly trafficking in a diversity of 
goods ranging from small arms and stolen cars, to human laborers and sex slaves, most 
criminal networks continue to generate their prime revenue stream from drug trafficking, 
the staple of the global shadow economy.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) estimated that as much as $1.6 trillion in criminal proceeds, largely 
                                                 
16
 Regarding my research question and the definition and operationalization of terms: A 
nation’s “success” in drug control efforts and the elimination of significant levels of illicit 
crop production is defined as a continuing period of five or more years of downward 
trends in illicit production, or positive assessments over the same period of time from the 
UNODC and the US State Department.  (A corroborative substantiation of steady 
progress in crop reduction from the UNODC or US State Department may be pertinent 
due to the possibility of anomalous production spikes in overall downward trends of 
illicit crop production.)  
 
The “illicit crops” focused upon in the research are restricted to coca and opium poppy, 
leaving aside cannabis and other more exotic illicit drug crops.  I would speculate that 
there are both many parallels and many differences between cannabis and other major 
illicit crops in relation to production, processing, and trafficking.  However, the scope of 
my research does not allow for an exploration of this assumption.  
 
Finally, “drug supply control efforts,” or various related references to “drug control 
initiatives,” should be interpreted as broadly generic terminology that could entail many 
different kinds of activities, programs, and projects designed ultimately to reduce illicit 
crop cultivation and/or illegal drug supply.  Such actions might come in the form of 
alternative development and programs to introduce legal alternative cash crops to rural 
farmers.  Alternately, drug control measures might primarily focus on enhanced law 
enforcement.  One particularly controversial drug supply control initiative is the forced 
eradication of illicit crops in the field.     
 
 8 
derived from drug trafficking, was laundered through legal enterprises in 2009, which 
would have accounted for 2.7 percent of global GDP that year.
17
 
     Huge profits from drug trafficking operations endow powerful criminals with a greater 
wherewithal to finance a wide range of criminal activities.  This money also serves to buy 
the influence and protection of corrupt policemen, politicians, and bankers. If we can 
determine the factors that have led to the sustained elimination of significant illicit crop 
production and successful drug supply control in some countries, it may be possible to 
focus on facilitating these conditions elsewhere in future efforts.  In turn, if drug control 
efforts were generally more successful, we might be able to effectively restrict illicit 
revenue streams and curtail the growing resources and power of dangerous transnational 
criminal networks.  
     The second justification for pursuing this research is the fact that cocaine and heroin 
are dangerous drugs that kill scores of users and destroy countless lives every year.  By 
2011, cocaine use in the US had declined to nearly half its peak in 2006, but there are 
markets for the drug that are growing in parts of Europe, South America, and Africa.  
Similarly, heroin addiction is rapidly rising in many parts of the world, particularly in 
China.
18
  Heroin use in the US has climbed steadily in recent years as well, with users 
doubling between 2007-2012.
19
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 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Illicit Money: How Much Is Out There?” October 25, 





 David Eimer, “It’s happy hour for the Heroin traffickers of the Golden Triangle,” South 




     There is also a spike in drug use and addiction in drug crop-producer countries and all 
along drug trafficking routes, in addition to an associated preponderance of criminals and 
criminal activity in these afflicted zones.  In the Golden Triangle, the opium addiction 
rate among males in some drug-producing villages was as high as 70-80 percent in the 
1960s.
20
  Analogously, the chronic use of cocaine and less expensive derivatives has 
besieged a growing number of societies across Central and South America in recent 
years.  The smoking of “pasta base,” a cheap and highly toxic byproduct of cocaine 
processing, has percolated through the sprawling favela wastelands of cocaine production 
and trafficking zones in Latin America, spreading violence and addiction.
21
  If illicit crop 
cultivation could be more effectively and enduringly curtailed country to country, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19
 Kelly Riddell, “Hoffman’s death highlights U.S. spike in heroin use,” The Washington 
Times, 2-3-2014.  Accessed 2-5-14, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/3/hoffmanns-death-highlights-growing-
trend-us-heroin/.  The statistic is taken from a recent National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH), released 2013. 
 
20
 Bertil Lintner, “The Golden Triangle Opium Trade: An Overview,” Asia Pacific Media 




 Marcela Valente, “DRUGS-ARGENTINA: ‘Pasta Base’ Destructive but Not 
Invincible,” Inter Press Service News Agency, Sept. 12, 2006.  Accessed 2-25-14, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/09/drugs-argentina-pasta-base-destructive-but-not-
invincible/.  See also, Nathaniel Foote, “Paco: South America’s new drug of the poor,” 
The International Relations and Security Network (ISN), June 23, 2008.  Accessed 2-25-
14,  
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=88498.  Note: 
“Paco,” short for “pasta basica de cocaine,” or simply “pasta base,” used to be thrown 
away as byproduct garbage after the coca leaves were processed and the cocaine was 
extracted.  Paco is the chemical-laden, toxic mush that is left over after solvents like 
sulfuric acid, benzene, or kerosene have been mixed with the ground up leaves to yield 
the cocaine, as cocaine hydrochloride.  After the cocaine is extracted, the remaining mash 
of leaves and solvents is a dangerously impure cocaine sulfate, or paco.  Similar to the 
profile for crack cocaine, paco is purported to deliver a brief and intense high, and be 
 10 
would reduce attendant levels of drug production and drug traffic in those areas, and have 
a significantly positive impact on public health and safety in many parts of the world. 
     In summary, many countries are currently suffering dramatic increases in the rates of 
drug addiction and related crime, misery, and societal degradation.  HIV-infection is up 
in many places that are experiencing increases in heroin and IV drug use, while the 
wealth and malign influence of drug kingpins continue to grow.  With an improved 
knowledge of the specific causes of success or failure in drug supply control efforts, we 
could hope to more regularly effect success, and thereby make more inroads against the 
global scourges of drug addiction, drug trafficking, and transnational criminal activity. 
 
 
                   Illicit Crops, Drug Production, and Drug Supply Control Efforts:    
               A Preliminary Overview of Variable Dynamics and Drug Control Policy 
 
   Identification of the factors that most influence success or failure in sustaining 
reductions of illicit crop cultivation requires a prior ascertainment of the main factors that 
underlie illicit crop production in the first place.  A determination of these precursors 
may be achieved through careful comparison of currently active drug crop producers with 
former producers who have been able to sustain significant reductions in cultivation.  
Identification of key factors that are present in producer-countries currently classified as 
“Drug Majors,”
22
 but absent from those that no longer produce illicit crops on a large 
                                                                                                                                                 





 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Determination – Major 
Drug Transit and Drug Producing Countries for FY 2014, Memorandum for the Secretary 
of State,” September 13, 2014.  Accessed 1-23-14, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
 11 
scale, may provide a list of likely causal variables that must be remediated or mitigated in 
order to successfully reduce drug production in a given country or region.   
     Surveying the literature in the field, several interrelated environmental factors or 
conditions that appear to be prerequisite for drug production in a nation or region 
consistently emerge.  This list includes ongoing war or armed conflict, insufficient state 
authority and weak territorial control, a climate of lawlessness, poverty and food 
insecurity, remoteness and lack of infrastructure and development, and a cultural history 
of drug crop production.  Based on a method of process-tracing in individual case studies, 
an evaluation of how effectively a nation’s anti-drug efforts dealt with these 
environmental conditions should clarify the effect that these variables have on the 
outcome of drug supply control initiatives in various cases.  Finally, after a process of 
comparative analysis across cases, I expect to be able to draw some general conclusions 
about the causal variables that most influence success or failure in illicit crop reduction 
and drug supply control efforts. 
 
     The first three characteristics – conflict, poor state control, and lawlessness – are 
closely linked, and together make very fertile ground for drug production and criminal 
activity.  In fact, the handful of countries given to large-scale illegal drug production and 
                                                                                                                                                 
office/2013/09/13/presidential-determination-major-drug-transit-and-drug-producing-
countri.  Note: For FY 2014, the President identified the following countries as major 
drug transit and/or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, 
Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.  The majority of these countries are apparently 
listed for transit, not production.  The document states that, “A country's presence on the 
foregoing list is not a reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level of 
cooperation with the United States.”   
 12 
organized crime that do not experience concurrent conditions of armed conflict and weak 
state control are mostly pariah states and outliers that have turned drugs and crime into 
big state-run business.   
     For example, along with the counterfeiting of currency, the government of North 
Korea itself is purported to be a major manufacturer and exporter of methamphetamines.  
Similarly, although not experiencing insurgent conflict, some nations formerly in the 
orbit of the Soviet Union have apparently experienced the criminal capture of significant 
sectors of state government and are now given to major transnational operations in drugs 
and crime.  There are other examples of state-run drug production as well, but these are 
not the norm.  It is more common that illicit crop cultivation and drug production occur 
mainly outside of state control. 
     Geographic areas that are not governed by a strong state authority capable of 
maintaining stability and enforcing the rule of law are vulnerable to domination by 
organized bands of insurgents, criminals, or terrorists that require unrestricted 
environments in order to operate.  This accurately describes the majority of conflict zones 
around the world, where outlaw groups contest the weakened state’s monopoly on 
violence and vie for control over territory and resources.  Facilitated by the lack of 
governance and law enforcement in such regions, these groups often support themselves 
with profits from the production and trafficking of illicit goods, including illegal drugs.
23
 
                                                 
23
 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Shooting Up: The Drug Trade and Military Conflict,” 
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association, 2005 Annual Meeting, 
Washington, DC.  
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     Over time, an unfortunate transformation can occur as increased revenue from illegal 
business operations enables rebels to purchase better weaponry and military equipment.
24
  
In turn, a rebel army with greater firepower is more formidable and has an increased 
capability to effectively carry out insurgent operations, including the defense and 
expansion of lucrative criminal enterprises like illicit crop cultivation and drug 
production.  Armed conflict and the drug trade regularly evolve this kind of mutually 
reinforcing relationship, creating a vicious cycle that can be difficult to counter.  
Subsequent efforts to reduce illicit crop production are easily sidelined by besieged states 
primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations, and drug supply control measures 
that do get initiated in conflict zones are often defeated amidst the chaos of war. 
     These particular confluential dynamics surrounding drug production are dissected in 
the writings and lectures of Svante E. Cornell,
25
 researcher at Johns Hopkins University, 
and Vanda Felbab-Brown,
26
 Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute.  Both authors detail 
how rebel armies operating in areas of contested authority are commonly financed by 
drug production and drug trafficking, and their research is frequently cited in discourse 
concerning the destructive symbiotic relationship between the drug trade and civil 
conflict.  Similarly, there is a historical background of armed conflict and destabilization 
in each of the following case studies of illicit crop production detailed here. 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 11-12. 
 
25
 Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications,”  
 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 3 (April 2007): 207-227. 
 
26
 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Shooting Up: the Drug Trade and Military Conflict.”  
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     Economist and author Paul Collier has also written extensively on the many 
complexities of armed conflict and the “conflict trap.”
27
  In The Bottom Billion and other 
writings, he has also detailed how production and traffic of contraband like drugs has 
repeatedly provided financial support for rebel forces.  Substantiating a strong 
correlation, Collier confirms that “Ninety-five percent of global production of hard drugs, 
for example, is from conflict countries.”
28
      
     Corroborating the research of Cornell and Felbab-Brown, Collier has found that many 
wars are perpetuated by soldiers who have developed a financial stake in sustaining a 
chaotic and lawless environment that is conducive to illicit activity.  The vicious cycle 
involving conflict and the corrupting influence of the drug trade is such that possibly 
onetime legitimate political grievance regularly devolves into motivations of pure greed.  
This profile also accurately characterizes many pro-government militias operating in 
conflict zones, as the temptation to exploit money-making opportunities in the absence of 
authority draws all sides into the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.       
     The work of Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy concerning opium production, drug prohibition, 
and drug supply control policy is also widely cited in the field.  In Opium: Uncovering 
the Politics of the Poppy, he traces the modern history of opium production in Southeast 
and Southwest Asia.
29
  Here, Chouvy describes the way that weakened state authority and 
war have recurrently created opportune contexts for crime and drug production in this 
                                                 
27
 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What 
Can Be Done About It (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 18-37. 
 
28
 Ibid., 31.  
 
29
 Chouvy, Opium.  
 
 15 
part of the world.  From the Shan State area of eastern Myanmar, to war-torn 
Afghanistan, Chouvy details how opium production has naturally gravitated to lawless 
regions rife with conflict.  As we shall see, detailed in the case history profiles sections 
below, from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia to the Andean nations of Latin 
America, a terrible trifecta involving illicit crop cultivation, armed conflict, and weak 
state control of territory appears to be ever-present. 
     Other characteristics of drug-producing regions are also closely associated – 
geographic remoteness, a lack of development, and poverty all contribute to food scarcity 
and food insecurity.  In remote, undeveloped areas that are wracked by violence and 
chaos, impoverished rural populations often find very few alternatives to growing coca or 
poppy in order to buy food and survive.       
     There is a wide consensus in the literature that food scarcity and food insecurity are 
major drivers of illicit crop cultivation around the world.  Though the specific reasons for 
food insecurity may be complex and vary from region to region, in nearly all drug crop 
producing areas one finds chronically impoverished farmers that are desperately trying to 
feed their families.  In these remote and undeveloped regions, the people often have 
difficulty growing enough staple foods to feed themselves and need to earn cash to buy 
supplementary food, generally rice or wheat.  Without transportation infrastructure to get 
legal goods and produce to market, the only buyers that come to them are the 
 16 
narcotraffickers, trekking through the jungles and over the mountains, anxious to buy 
coca leaves and opium.
30
 
     For example, the rugged upstream Mekong valley, where heavy monsoon rains wash 
over mountainous countryside, represents the wild territory called the Golden Triangle.  
This is the rustic highland region of Southeast Asia, where the borders of Burma 
(Myanmar), Laos, and Thailand meet.   
     The inhabitants of the remote and undeveloped highlands of Southeast Asia are mostly 
tribal peoples.  They traditionally practice slash-and-burn agriculture and often have 
difficulty producing rice yields sufficient to feed their families.  A lack of irrigation and 
adequate manpower are common agricultural dilemmas in this region.  This is described 
in some detail by Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy,
31
 and it is also documented in numerous reports 
from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the flagship international 
body associated with monitoring drug production, drug trafficking, and drug control 
policy implementation.       
     The role of food scarcity and food insecurity in driving opium production in the 
Golden Triangle in general, and in Thailand specifically, is also confirmed by author 
Ronald D. Renard in his influential study for the United Nations International Drug 




                                                 
30
 Adam Isacson, “The Tragedy of Alternative Development in Colombia,” Colombia 




 Chouvy, Opium, 131-41. 
32
 Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000: A Thirty-Year Journey  
(Bangkok, Thailand: UNDCP / Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2001), 28-32. 
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     By comparison, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy explains that in the mountainous nation of 
Afghanistan and much of the Golden Crescent, it is the large households and limited 
availability of arable land that has put the rural populations in similar circumstances 
involving food scarcity and food insecurity.
33
  As a result, many Afghan farmers cultivate 
opium poppy in order to generate the money to buy sufficient stores of wheat for 
themselves and their large families.  In efforts to avoid hunger and starvation, the poorest 
of Afghan farmers find few alternatives to growing opium poppy.   Reinforcing this 
course of action, similar to other drug crop regions, many destitute farmers find that they 
can secure loans only to grow opium, not licit crops.
34
  
     The research of author Lamond Tullis has further supported the basic assessment 
linking poverty and a lack of economic alternatives with the drug trade.
35
  Noting that 
desperately impoverished urbanites also have sometimes migrated to rural growing 
regions to cultivate illicit crops, particularly coca, Tullis concurs that, “Poverty and the 
absence of alternative income pursuits therefore contribute to criminal involvement in the 
drug trade.”
36
      
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Note: Now defunct as such, the UNDCP was combined with the Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Division in the United Nations to form the UNODC in 1997. 
 
33
 Ibid., 133-41. 
 
34
 Ibid., 139. 
 
35
 Lamond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs & Drug Policies in Nine 
Countries, UN Research Institute for Social Development and UN University (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 
   
36




     In various ways, a major drug crop producing region will almost always exhibit all of 
the aforementioned prerequisite characteristics simultaneously.
37
  Interestingly, by 
comparison, many non-producer countries possess some or most of these conditions, yet 
they are not major producers of illicit crops.  For example, countries that have rural 
populations that suffer from poverty, food scarcity, and a lack of development, but 
experience no armed insurgency and are well policed by an authoritative government 
with strong territorial control, are likely to escape the yoke of a thriving drug trade.  On 
the other hand, unfortunately, they may also be forced to indefinitely endure government 
repression and grinding poverty with few alternatives.  
     The nation of Vietnam appears to fit into this category, with a government that has a 
history of exacting capital punishment for possession of even relatively very small 
amounts of illicit drugs.
38
  At the same time, little consistent effort has gone to 
establishing alternative development (AD) and alternative livelihoods to sustain would-be 
poppy farmers.      
                                                 
37
 Note: There are a few unique cases that do not exhibit these characteristics, but they 
are anomalies and should be considered outliers to the norm.  For example, the 
Netherlands is a well-developed nation that hosts a significant amount of illegal cannabis 
cultivation.  However, it is obvious that this is a result of their quasi-legal cannabis 
economy, and the longstanding incongruity of their “legal frontdoor, illegal backdoor” 
drug policy. 
38
 James Windle, “The Suppression of Illicit Opium Production in Viet Nam: An 
Introductory Narrative,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 57, Issue 4 (May, 2012): 
425-439.  See also, “Vietnam reduces opium poppy fields,” The Vietnam News/ 
Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2001.  Accessed 1-24-14, 
http://patrick.guenin2.free.fr/cantho/vnnews/poppy.htm.  
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     Repressive governments notwithstanding, it is encouraging that a number of countries 
do not produce illicit crops in significant quantities despite exhibiting some or most of the 
deleterious characteristics listed above.  It indicates that if one or more of these negative 
drivers is missing or radically altered, it may make a crucial difference.  It may prevent or 
disrupt the destructive spiral that enables drug production, and create space for 
progressive movement.       
     In most regions that host significant levels of illicit crop cultivation, all of the 
aforementioned interrelated negative characteristics manifest simultaneously.  It is this 
unfortunate confluence of conditions that predicates a vicious cycle, miring nations in 
illicit crop production and the drug trade.  However, progress in the mitigation of just one 
contributing factor can begin to disrupt the destructive synergy and help to enable 
progress in other problem areas.        
     For example, an infrastructure project to build roads in a drug-producing region 
renders that area less remote, and more accessible to state authority and law enforcement, 
an essential step toward establishing stability and the rule of law.  Roadways also greatly 
improve access for the military, which is often denied easy entry to undeveloped areas of 
the conflict-zone where rebel armies take refuge and illicit crops are cultivated.  In drug-
producing countries, it is common that these remote areas shelter anti-government 
insurgents financed by the drug trade.   
     In turn, increased governmental control of national territory might contribute to 
decisive military advances, and an environment more conducive to peace talks and 
negotiations.  Peace and stability would bring the opportunity to conduct more extensive 
AD projects in a safe and stable environment.  Finally, in such an environment, the new 
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roads would be essential for the timely and efficient transport of licit crops and products 
as viable alternatives to illegal coca and opium.   
     The positive scenario outlined above is actually what appears to be occurring in 
Colombia right now.  It is also something that the Peruvian government envisions and is 
currently attempting to manifest in the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (known as 
the VRAE).  The VRAE is an area that was recently assessed by the UN as the world’s 
biggest producer of coca, and the environment hosts all of the defined negative 
characteristics that commonly affect drug-producing regions.
39
  
     After carefully considering both the generic and specific case descriptions above, one 
can begin to appreciate the complexity of the mutually-reinforcing conditions 
surrounding illicit crop production, and the way in which governments might hope to turn 
the tide and begin to effect positive change in troubled drug-producing areas.  The 
positive model describes a chain of events that is like a mirror image of the negative 
spiral that manifests in afflicted drug-producing zones, because it is predicated on the 
same close symbiotic relationship of the fundamental characteristics inherent in the 
environment.  
     According to the model, by employing appropriate initiatives and tactics, the 
interrelated nature of these negative environmental factors is harnessed, altered, and 
turned around, as a drug-producing region is steadily rendered less remote and more 
stable.  As ideally described above, such action would progressively facilitate drug 
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supply control objectives, as vicious circles of circumstances surrounding drug 
production are transformed into new virtuous cycles capable of producing their own 
forward momentum for change.   
     But before AD programs or infrastructure projects like road building can be 
successfully conducted, there must exist a certain level of peace and stability in the 
environment.  Admittedly, the overall level of conflict in the VRAE is lower than in the 
worst drug-producing provinces of Afghanistan, where various initiatives have been 
delayed or abandoned.  In areas experiencing higher levels of conflict, aid workers risk 
being kidnapped
40
 or killed, and projects risk being sabotaged and ruined.
41
   
     Therefore, it is often necessary to first work toward establishing an environment 
relatively free from active hostilities before development projects can proceed.  There can 
be little hope of substantively remediating other enabling factors of drug production 
amidst endemic chaos and violence.  Of course, ending armed civil conflict is not easy to 
do.  But establishing a relatively peaceful, stable environment based on law and order 
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 Simeon Tegel, “Peru: Cocaine king’s riches don’t reach growers,” GlobalPost, Oct. 15, 
2013.  Accessed 2-25-14, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/peru/131014/cocaine-coca-
vrae-farmers-drug-war.  Note: In July, 2013, Peruvian rebels temporarily halted the 
government road building project in the VRAE through an arson attack on heavy 
machinery used to lay the tarmac.  See also, Gary Yia Lee, “The Hmong of Laos: 
Overview of Their Transnational Adaptation,” The First International Workshop on the 
Hmong/Miao in Asia, September 11-13, 1998.  Accessed 4-17-14, 
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~yeulee/Topical/hmong%20of%20laos.html.  In this 
paper, Dr. Lee details how a UNDP opium replacement project that began in 1991 in the 
Vientiane region was completely halted a few years later when road construction reached 
Pha Lavae, where the project workers were met with armed resistance.  
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should be considered an essential prerequisite to achieving lasting success in illicit crop 
reduction and drug supply control.   
    As previously stated, identifying the standard environmental attributes that accompany 
illicit crop production is a logical preliminary to evaluating success and failure in 
reducing production and controlling illegal drug supply.  After achieving an advanced 
understanding of the common drivers underlying illicit crop production, one is then able 
to assess whether or not particular initiatives or projects are aptly aimed to significantly 
alter those causal factors.  
     Unfortunately, current anti-drug policy has been widely criticized as failing to 
adequately address the root causes of illicit crop production, while placing too much 
emphasis on prohibition and forced eradication.  Perhaps this is why reductions of illicit 
crop cultivation seem so difficult to achieve, and even harder to sustain.  It may be that 
the policy tools that are most often used to reduce drug production are not optimal for the 
job, and only capable of achieving temporary and qualified success.  
     Certainly, a temporary reduction of acreage under illicit production can be achieved 
by a single vigorous campaign of forced eradication.  And a government that implements 
this policy can be assured of authoritative international accolades and millions, if not 
billions, in aid and military equipment to continue the fight.  But aside from the harm that 
accrues to poor farmers and local residents as they are suddenly deprived of their 
livelihoods and means to feed their families, many expert observers question that 
eradication has any lasting benefit at all.  This is because eradication does nothing to 
mitigate the fundamental drivers of illicit crop production, and often actually exacerbates 
them in terms of increasing poverty and conflict in the region.  Furthermore, eradication 
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can have a radicalizing effect on a rural population, further weakening state legitimacy 
and consolidating support for the activity of armed rebels and narcotraffickers.
42
 
    
     In accordance with the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and 
subsequent complimentary conventions, there is official multilateral consensus regarding 
the strict control of opium and coca production.  However, as suggested above, 
international issues surrounding illicit drug production and drug suppression policy have 
long been dominated in direction and tone by the United States with an emphasis on 
“supply-side solutions.”        
     Heavy-handed militarization and law enforcement aspects of the “War on Drugs” have 
always drawn criticism and controversy for the collateral destruction that occurs, but 
currently there is much debate about the essential effectiveness of conventional drug 
supply control tactics.  Moreover, some have raised questions about the validity of the 
basic rationale governing the overall strategy of drug control policy.  
     The theoretical underpinnings of illicit crop eradication, as a part of contemporary 
international drug control strategy, derive from market economics and the basic law of 
supply and demand as it affects commodity prices.  As officially stated, the main strategic 
goal of crop eradication has been to reduce the overall supply of an illegal drug in order 
to substantially drive up street prices, thereby deterring customers with prohibitively 
exorbitant costs for illegal drugs.   
     But the desired result has not manifested for any sustained duration, largely due to the 
elasticity of the illegal drug market, and other characteristics of supply and demand 
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 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru,” Current History, 
105.688 (Feb. 2006): 79-83.  
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creating what are called “displacement effects.”  Like the air in a squeezed balloon will 
simply be displaced and bulge out in another area, restricted drug supply in one region 
displaces production to another by actively incentivizing potential producers in other 
areas through the rising value of illicit crops created by reduced global supply. This 
particular displacement phenomenon has been termed the “balloon effect.” Most 
observers accept that this dynamic regularly occurs, and therefore believe that past crop 
eradication and production suppression efforts have been largely unproductive.   
     But some observers have alleged that the results are even worse than merely 
unproductive.  Authors such as Paul Gootenberg
43
 and Bruce Bagley
44
 claim that 
displacement effects have made contemporary drug suppression efforts 
counterproductive, resulting in cheaper drugs of higher purity and an increased global 
supply.  
     Similarly, historian Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy authoritatively criticizes the effectiveness 
of the current anti-drug strategy.
45
  He points out that the notorious “Golden Triangle” 
region itself initially emerged as the result of a “balloon effect,” after the Chinese banned 
opium exports and slashed production in 1949, and the Iranians banned production in 
1955.
46
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     Often cited in the literature, historian and author Alfred W. McCoy concurs with the 
idea that many Western drug-control policies have exacerbated the problem and actually 
increased global drug supplies.
47
  This is a sensible conclusion, since the kind of “drug-
control” that Western powers exercised for more than a century was chiefly characterized 
by monopoly and profit, rather than prohibition.  McCoy explains that through vigorous 
and aggressive imperial sponsorship of the opium trade, from the late eighteenth
 
century 
through the early years of the twentieth century, opium production became embedded 
“into the tribal economies of highland Asia and its consumption into the urban cultures of 
Asia and the West.”
48
   
     McCoy posits that more contemporary drug war maneuvers have been based on an 
underestimation of the deep economic roots and tenacious elasticity of the drug market as 
a longstanding integral facet of global commerce.  After World War I, as voluntary 
national regulation of narcotics gave way to mandatory international controls, almost 
limitless opportunity for profit was simultaneously created in the form of a black market 
for illicit substances, with a vast established and demanding global customer base. 
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 Alfred W. McCoy, “Coercion and its Unintended Consequences: A Study of Heroin 
Trafficking in Southeast and South West Asia,” 191-224.  Note: Many consider Alfred 
W. McCoy as the premier authority on the mid/late twentieth century opium and heroin 
trade in Southeast Asia, and his works are very widely cited.  Aside from the above 
article, I will be drawing from two of his books:  
 
Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, 1973). 
 
Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade 
(Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia) (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill 
Books / New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2003).  Note: This is a revised and extensively 
supplemented edition of the title from Harper & Row, 1975. 
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     Consequently, suppression of the resilient illegal drug industry in one place after 
another has simply pushed drug traffickers further and further afield, obliging them to 
cultivate myriad alternative suppliers and networks, in a displacement phenomenon that 
has been called the “cockroach effect.”
49
  As a result, McCoy explains that the upshot of 
prohibition has been that narcotraffickers have now spread to every corner of the globe 
with increased sophistication and ability.  He states: 
 
           Despite some initial success, America’s drug war had thus produced a  
           paradoxical strengthening of the global narcotics traffic.  By the late 1970s, 
           the simplex of the Turkey-Marseilles-New York heroin pipeline had been 
           replaced by a complex of international smuggling routes that tied the  
           disparate zones of First World consumption to Third World narcotics  
           production. With production and consumption now dispersed about the  
           globe, the international traffic was far more resistant to suppression  
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 Bagley, “The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin America,” 
113.  Note: When a significant level of illicit crop cultivation is suppressed in one region, 
rising prices incentivize illegal cultivation by farmers in less restricted regions, and the 
overall global supply of the drug is eventually compensated.  This transfer of illegal crop 
cultivation and production, back and forth between regions and nations, has been 
famously called the “balloon effect.”  Similarly, the “cockroach effect” is an amusing 
term, used by some to describe how drug traffickers and persons involved in the illegal 
drug trade scatter to other places and other trafficking operations due to heavy law 
enforcement action in a particular territory or trafficking corridor.  Finally then, 
authorities are forced to play a frustrating game of “whack-a-mole,” trying to suppress 
activity as it pops up in one place after another. (These terms are referenced by Bagley, as 
quoted by John Lyons, “Cocaine: The New Front Lines,” Wall Street Journal, January 
14, 2012.  Accessed 12-4-14, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204331304577145101343740004.)   
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     But some critics insist that the counterproductivity of the balloon effect and other 
displacement phenomena has been overstated.  These observers believe that even with a 
measure of displacement, eradication and suppression are productive and important 
because they significantly disrupt criminal activity and criminal networks.  Authors 
James Windle and Graham Farrell point out that this disruption necessarily incurs a loss 
in illegal profit, as well as substantial additional costs for the relocation and 
reestablishment of criminal operations.
51
  Drawing from the work of others in the field of 
criminology,
52
 Windle and Farrell also endorse principles of “deflection” and 
“containment.”  These are ideas about shaping and routing the displacement flows of 
criminal activity in ways that may benefit law enforcement and the public welfare. 
 
    In the context of the academic debate over contemporary anti-drug policy, it should be 
noted that the ubiquitous official governmental and intergovernmental reports and 
assessments of drug production and drug suppression are generally tacit endorsements of 
the current orientation and strategy of the Drug War.  As such, they provide a hefty 
counterweight to academic and popular detractors.  Cumulatively, these publications and 
pronouncements perpetuate a powerful directional momentum of discourse, shaped and 
led by UN and US government agencies.        
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     As a definitive official overview and critique of the background and current status of 
US and international drug control policy, I refer to Liana Sun Wyler’s recent 
congressional report.
53
  In my research, I also refer to the work done by Ms. Wyler and 
others in another recent report to congress on US counterdrug programs in Latin 
America.
54
     
                                           
    Considering the common occurrence of displacement effects and other significant 
traumas, it is difficult to declare any drug suppression effort an “unqualified success.”  
But for the many people who live in a drug-producing region that is negatively impacted 
by the escalated levels of crime, violence, and addiction that accompany the drug trade 
and drug production, the elimination of widespread illicit crop cultivation for an extended 
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 Note: In the course of case-analysis I will further explore the ramifications of 
displacement effects and other possible harms that accrue from drug suppression 
activities.  Ramifications will be analyzed as potentially influential elements in a 
historical process, elements that may or may not affect durable and definitive success in 
limiting illicit crop production.  An operationalizing definition of “success” and other 
terms contained in the research question are included below in the sections discussing 
research methods and methodology.  
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     However, where drug crops have been eradicated and drug production has been 
eliminated without the prior introduction and establishment of attainable opportunities for 
alternative livelihoods and food security, substantially increased suffering may result.  
And if widespread increases in illness, hunger, and poverty result from the forced 
elimination of illicit crop cultivation, it would be misleading to claim that the initiative 
was successful, no matter how many hectares of coca or poppy were destroyed.    
     Moreover, in such a case declarations of success regarding the elimination of illicit 
production might also be wholly premature.  This is because eradication and suppression 
of illicit production without previously developed opportunities for alternative 
livelihoods exacerbates the fundamental drivers of drug crop cultivation.  With increased 
poverty and food insecurity, there is a greater likelihood that the desperate population 
will eventually resume illicit crop production in order to earn money to buy food, and the 
success of prior drug suppression initiatives will not be sustained.  
     This portrait may accurately describe some of the process that has transpired in both 
Myanmar and Laos, two countries that are currently experiencing rapid increases in 
opium production.  The extent to which counterproductive dynamics were set in motion 
by premature crop eradication and have subsequently contributed to utterly failed drug 
control efforts in Laos will be carefully considered in the case study of that nation.    
 
     There are two different tactical branches of contemporary international drug supply 
control strategy: one is based on law enforcement and eradication, and the other involves 
the promotion of a wide variety of AD programs and projects. At best, these two 
branches are able to work in concert and can compliment each other.  At worst, they work 
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at cross-purposes and render all efforts unproductive, or even counterproductive.  As 
discussed throughout this paper, proper proportion and sequencing of AD and eradication 
operations is crucial.   
     It is important to note that many international anti-drug efforts incorporate both types 
of tactical approach – sometimes referred to as “the carrot and the stick” -- in various 
proportions. But one should also realize that it is “the stick” that has been featured 
overwhelmingly in international anti-drug policy and supply control initiatives in recent 
decades. Producer-countries are tracked, rated, and dealt with primarily in terms of law 
enforcement and number of hectares that they have eradicated.  In other words, for many 
years, militarized eradication operations and enforcement of the prohibition regime have 
vigorously dominated international anti-drug policy.        
     There are often AD projects running concurrently with eradication and law 
enforcement operations, but it is the latter that carries the momentum and main focus of 
the primary players.  Consequently, it is eradication and militarization that continue to 
capture the lion’s share of financial sponsorship for anti-drug efforts abroad.  Dramatic 
center stage pronouncements from the White House and the State Department implicating 
dangerous “Drug Majors” trump boring, back-page bureaucratic assessments from the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), recommending more 
subsidies for AD projects in the Third World. 
     Leaders in producer nations clearly understand that officials from the US and the UN 
want to see their governments dedicated to robust eradication efforts, with impressive 
numbers to prove it.  This kind of action plays well for everybody, and has been one of 
the most apparent results of the White House “Certification Process” of producer nations.  
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At the end of the process, the President either validates a government for its commitment 
to anti-drug initiatives and qualifies them for aid money and military equipment, or he 
condemns their behavior and leaves them high and dry.
56
        
     Recently however, there has been some official acknowledgement of the downside 
repercussions of forced eradication.  For example, such recognition was signified by 
Richard Holbrooke’s critical statements and his suspension of eradication operations by 
the US in Afghanistan.
57
 
     For many years, alternative development has been marginalized by a tough drug war 
mindset, alongside a facile bureaucratic drive to record large numbers representing 
officially destroyed crops.  Progress in establishing AD and viable licit crop substitution 
is much slower, less sensational, and less easily quantified.  Consequently, it makes a less 
ideal political football for politicians in all involved countries.  Sadly, this has translated 
into insufficient international political support and inconsistent financial assistance for 
AD in illicit crop producing countries.  This unfortunate record will be well documented 
in the exposition of my case histories.  Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that it is a 
development-oriented agenda, subordinately buttressed by law enforcement, that holds 
the most promise for lasting change and sustained reductions of coca and poppy 
cultivation. 
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     One way that law enforcement can effectively facilitate and support successful AD is 
through interdiction and disruption of the drug trafficking supply chain.  Through the 
arrest of traffickers and the destruction of processing labs, farm-gate prices for coca and 
poppy can be driven down.  It has been demonstrated that when there are no accessible 
processing facilities or available buyers, future production is discouraged as farmers are 
forced to dump their illicit harvest at greatly reduced prices.  This dynamic squares with 
market principles of supply and demand – if the demand from wholesale buyers is not 
present, prices for illicit crops will be deflated.  And if the price that farmers are able to 
obtain for drug crops is significantly deflated, they will be proportionately disincentivized 
to cultivate those crops.  Likewise, the cultivation of legal alternative crops would 
become more attractive to farmers as the profit potential of illicit crops was diminished.  
     Finally, it must be noted that although there are examples of very successful 
alternative development, the overall record is not terribly impressive.  Sometimes AD 
efforts can even make matters worse.
58
  In each of the three case studies presented here, 
there are examples of AD initiatives that were attempted and failed to sustain reductions 
in illicit crop cultivation.  In these instances, the composition of apparently ineffectual 
AD programs and relevant circumstances surrounding AD implementation efforts will be 
closely studied. 
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          Aside from his history of opium, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy has authored writings that 
are definitive to a critical discussion of AD, and other methods of illicit crop reduction.  
His recent article in the Journal of Drug Issues contributes an analysis of three different 
supply control tactics that have frequently been used: the forced eradication of illicit 
crops, opium bans, and alternative development.
59
  
     Exemplified by some of the scenarios discussed above, Chouvy suggests that 
unintended repercussions of the aforementioned strategies have the capacity to decisively 
influence the overall outcomes of drug suppression efforts.  He maintains that these 
tactics, and the particular ways in which they are implemented, affect poor farmers of 
illicit crops in different ways that carry the potential to facilitate either the success or 
failure of a nation’s drug suppression efforts.  In the course of my research, I observe 
how Chouvy’s conclusion relates to examples of AD and other types of drug supply 
control initiatives in each of my three cases. 
 
     In the preceding overview, I have introduced and outlined the basic facts, history, 
policy, phenomena and dynamics intrinsic to research concerning illicit crop production 
and attempts to control the supply of illicit coca and opium.  Briefly summarized, 
conflict, lawlessness, poverty, a lack of development, and food insecurity seem to be 
prerequisite environmental conditions for illicit crop cultivation.  These characteristics 
are mutually reinforcing.  However, it is possible to turn them around, one by one, to 
create a positive synergy capable of underwriting effective drug supply control efforts.  
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     Finally, there are two basic types of tactics that have been employed in an effort to 
alter these endemic conditions in producer-nations: 1) crop eradication and law 
enforcement, and 2) alternative development.  Ideally, these two tactics compliment each 
other.  Less ideally, and perhaps more historically common, they can clash and make the 
situation even worse.  In fact, many believe that increases in the global supply of illicit 
drugs have been driven by aggressive eradication operations that have forced 
narcotraffickers to become much more sophisticated and greatly expand their networks 
and expertise.  This characterization applies to the dynamic of the last forty years or so, 
since Richard Nixon first declared a war on drugs.   
 
                                                    Regarding Hypotheses 
 
     Because there is a frequent incidence of covariance between different independent 
variables that tend to cluster around drug production, as explained in the preceding 
section, classical hypotheses concerning the direct effect of one variable on the dependent 
variable is not possible.  Instead, I establish an ideal type of illicit crop cultivation and 
drug-producing environment, and I illustrate the adherence or non-adherence to that 
typology through process tracing and comparative case study.  Non-adherence may result 
from a process of successfully altering environmental factors through drug control efforts 
and AD programs, for example.  By the conclusion, sufficient qualitative comparison and 
analysis has been made to allow for the positing of generalizations concerning causal 




                                              Regarding Research Methods  
 
     The two research methods that I have chosen for the investigation of my research 
question are both case-oriented methods.  In the first phase of research, I employ a 
within-case method of process tracing, followed by a second phase involving a 
comparative method of analysis among all three of my case studies.  
     The following sections contain expositions of three countries and their histories 
regarding illicit crop cultivation and drug supply control efforts.  The first of those 
countries has a long record of successfully curtailing illicit crop production (Thailand), 
while the second nation is a case of nearly complete failure, with current dramatic rises in 
illegal crop cultivation and drug production (Laos).  The third country profiled has a 
promising, yet relatively brief and tenuous hold on successful drug supply control 
(Colombia), and exhibits characteristics reminiscent of both the cases of success and 
failure presented here.   
     By virtue of comparing and contrasting the causal variables surrounding illicit crop 
cultivation and drug supply control in the first two countries, causal variables are more 
easily identified in the third case.  In other words, as a consequence of understanding the 
variables and dynamics involved in success and failure in the first two cases, the main 
determinants of enduring success or gradual deterioration and failure of drug supply 
control in Colombia become apparent.  
     In tracing the processes in each case, I parse through individual national histories 
regarding opium or coca production.  An effort is made to identify what independent 
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variables are most prominently in play before, during, and after the formation and 
execution of their supply control policies.  I consider all the prerequisite environmental 
characteristics previously discussed, as well as factors surrounding law enforcement and 
alternative development initiatives, as important independent variables with the potential 
to influence the success or failure of anti-drug efforts. 
     Throughout the course of process tracing, I pay close attention to what may be 
characterized in the literature as key moments or periods in a nation’s process, leading to 
success or failure of drug control initiatives.  I attempt to identify the causal influence of 
specific variables at these pivotal times. 
    Political scientist David Collier has called process tracing a “fundamental tool” for 
“within-case analysis based on qualitative data,”
60
 and I believe that process tracing is a 
logical choice of methodologies to identify and analyze the independent variables in play 
during a nation’s history of illicit crop production and drug supply control efforts.  
Collier also states that the method is valuable to the researcher as a tool for “gaining 
insight into causal mechanisms,”
61
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     Case study is an explanatory analysis of a person, group, or event.  The method 
benefits from the discreet or finite nature of a subject in attempting to explain the causes 
of a particular historical outcome, such as the success or failure of a drug suppression 
initiative.  In turn, case-oriented research involving an analytical comparison of separate 
instances of a similar outcome is useful in making generalizations concerning the causes 
of the outcome.
63
  After tracing the processes within each case leading to success or 
failure in illicit crop reduction and drug control efforts, the next logical step is to 
comparatively analyze my findings by cross-referencing conclusions regarding causal 
determinants for specific outcomes.     
     Finally, in comparing my three cases, I have the benefit of variation on the dependent 
variable: cases of failure, in addition to examples of successful drug supply control.  
Therefore, not only am I able to compare conclusions about the importance of particular 
variables in the two successful countries with each other, but I can also cross-reference 
those conclusions with my findings concerning their own past failure, and current failure 
in Laos.  Examples of past failure in Thailand and Colombia are educational when 
contrasted with their currently successful drug supply control efforts, and when compared 
with current failure in Laos.  I believe that this exercise helps to further clarify the 
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                         Chapter 2.  Opium Cultivation and Heroin Production  
                                      in Southeast Asia: The Golden Triangle 
 
 
   Poppy cultivation and opium production have been a cultural tradition in parts of 
Southern China for centuries.  As early as the ninth century BCE, southern migration 
from China brought diverse groups of people to Mainland Southeast Asia, eventually 
including the Hmong, who were skilled opium producers.
64
  Political persecution in the 
mid-nineteenth century sent larger waves of Hmong, Yao, Akha, and other tribes 
southward from China.  These tribes brought a knowledge of opium poppy cultivation to 
the region, and they settled mainly in the highland areas that are most suitable for 
growing the flowering plant.  These slash-and-burn agriculturalists produced opium and 
other goods for regional traders and caravanning groups like the Hui, who traveled and 
traded along networks originally established through the centuries-old tea trade.
65
 
     Meanwhile, the reigning colonial powers attempted to tightly restrict and control 
opium production within this region throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
in order to protect their lucrative monopolies in the thriving consumer markets. 
Therefore, they imported Indian, Turkish, and Persian opium to tax and sell in their 
colonies on the Indochinese peninsula, while discouraging regional production. As a 
consequence, large-scale production of opium in Southeast Asia did not occur until after 
World War II.   
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     For a variety of reasons, it was around this time when the French and the British both 
finally decided to change course, and encourage legal opium production within their 
Southeast Asian colonies for regional sale.  Thus, the modern opium industry in much of 
this zone -- Burma and Laos, for example -- began to grow under governmental 
sponsorship.
66
  Henceforth, even as the colonial era declined, the second half of the 
twentieth century hosted a series of events that facilitated the continual expansion of 
regional opium and heroin production. 
 
     One momentous event that spurred dramatic increases in Southeast Asian opium 
production was the victory of the Communists in China in 1949, and their ensuing well-
enforced suppression of opium cultivation.  The sudden elimination of the world’s 
premier powerhouse opium supplier left a huge void in production that demanded to be 
filled.  This had a phenomenal incentivizing effect on farmers and producers across the 
Indochinese peninsula, stimulating a boom in regional opium production, and the 
emergence of the Golden Triangle.
67
 
     Author Alfred W. McCoy also identifies the UN-led abolishment of legal state 
monopolies and sales of opium in Southeast Asia, between 1950 and 1961, as a pivotal 
historical event that created the formidable global supplier known as the “Golden 
Triangle.”
68
  At that point, free from official state control and oversight, intelligence 
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agencies across the region sanctioned allied paramilitary groups to run the newly illegal 
opium trafficking operations.
69
  Not long afterward, in order to supply US soldiers 
fighting in Vietnam, a cluster of heroin refining laboratories were established in the 
Golden Triangle in 1969-1970.
70
  These labs later produced exports for both the 
American and European drug markets. 
 
     US Vice-Secretary of State Marshall Green first used the term “Golden Triangle” to 
describe the swath of rugged territory in the borderlands between Burma, Laos, and 
Thailand in a press conference on July 12
th
, 1971.  His reference to the precious metal 
may have been intended to highlight the fact that big money in opium and heroin had 
been emanating from the area.
71
  But Green may also have been alluding to militia in the 
tri-state border region, commissioned by the Burmese government, that had been trading 
opium for bars of pure gold.
72
   
     In any case, the problematic situation in Southeast Asia was soon compounded by the 
commencement of Richard Nixon’s “War on Drugs” in 1972, and the dissolution of the 
drug trafficking networks dubbed “The French Connection.”  Reduced global supply of 
opiates due to the coerced cessation of Turkish opium production and heroin manufacture 
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in Marseilles laboratories inadvertently stimulated increased production elsewhere, 
especially in the Golden Triangle.
73
  
     In summary, longstanding cultural tradition converged with modern industry, 
innovations in transportation and commerce, economic laws of supply and demand, and 
geopolitics to create a boom in post-World War II opium production in Southeast Asia 
and the Golden Triangle.  A strong and pervasive opium culture had already been 
cultivated and reinforced in the region through the aggressive promotion of mass 
consumer demand over more than two centuries of colonial rule, ending with many years 
of officially sponsored large-scale production that continued after independence.  By the 
time of the coordinated international drug control and prohibition regime in the latter half 
of the twentieth century, the roots of opium use and production ran long and deep in 
Southeast Asia.  In addition, illicit production in the Golden Triangle was sometimes 
vigorously stimulated by a displacement effect caused by reduced opium and heroin 
production in other places, such as China, Iran, Turkey, and the labs in Marseilles.  
 
     Throughout the Cold War, major powers repeatedly found it strategically 
advantageous to forge alliances with criminal entities.  These dubious partnerships often 
involved the drug trade, and governments sheltering, or even facilitating and exploiting, 
illegal drug trafficking operations.
74
  Similarly, governments often condoned drug 
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production and trafficking by allied foreign military factions in order to finance their 
operations.
75
  Also, it has not been historically uncommon for state governments to 
finance their own covert military operations through direct involvement in the production 
and trafficking of illicit drugs.
76
  All three varieties of clandestine government 
sponsorship of the drug trade transpired in Southeast Asia and contributed significantly to 
the rise and preeminence of regional opium and heroin production in the 1970s. 
     Concurrent with the international prohibition regime, sporadic clandestine sponsorship 
of large-scale illicit crop cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking by the US and 
other world governments subverted drug-control objectives in particular situations and in 
general, and served to proliferate illegal networking and complicate the problem.
77
 As we 
shall see in the following case studies of Thailand and Laos, opium and heroin production 
and drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle was frequently advanced by duplicitous 
government policies in the past.   
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                                       Thailand: Can It Be Done Elsewhere?    
 
     Regarded by many as the best example of successful illicit crop reduction, Thailand’s 
alternative development programs and drug supply control initiatives have decreased 
domestic opium production and kept it at negligible levels for over fifteen years.
78
  This 
is an impressive achievement considering the large quantities of Thai opium and heroin 
that were produced during much of the latter half of the twentieth century.  But 
Thailand’s significance in the Southeast Asian drug trade was not limited simply to that 
of opium supplier.  For many years Thailand was also the main headquarters and 
trafficking hub for some of the biggest heroin kingpins and financiers in the Golden 
Triangle.  
     Although the successful reduction of illicit crops and suppression of opium production 
in Thailand is the issue of main interest here, the nature of the research requires that 
attention be paid to the totality of historic national involvement with drug production and 
drug trafficking, since they are all parts of a larger integrated whole.  This complex 
interrelatedness is illustrated in the following brief overview of all Thai activity related to 
illegal opium and heroin, from cultivation to commerce.  Subsequently, Thai opium 
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production and illicit crop reduction efforts will be specifically examined in greater 
detail. 
 
                                                 Thailand and the Triangle 
 
     The zone known as the Golden Triangle, and most of the rest of the Indochinese 
peninsula, collectively experienced a series of events in the late twentieth century that 
continually facilitated the expansion of illegal opium and heroin industries in the region.  
Some of the major events were discussed above, in the sectional introduction to Southeast 
Asian drug production.  But Burma, Laos, and Thailand also each possessed their own 
unique cultural, economic, and political conditions, and were influenced by their own 
unique historical events that shaped their involvement in the drug trade.  In Thailand, for 
example, members of specific ethnic minority groups factored decisively in the country’s 
contemporary involvement in the opium and heroin trade -- from the lowliest subsistence 
farmers to the most powerful crime bosses. 
 
     Thailand has long been home to the world’s largest community of Teochiu, or Chiu-
Chao peoples.
79
  A part of the Chinese diaspora, the Teochiu have a lengthy history as a 
politically privileged merchant and noble class in Thailand.  Perhaps the wealthiest and 
most powerful of all the world’s underground networks, the Teochiu syndicates had the 
finances and political connections needed to achieve a near monopoly on opium and 
heroin trafficking in the Golden Triangle.  Kingpins from major Hong Kong-based 
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Teochiu triads invested heavily in the operations of Teochiu in Thailand, and helped 





     The history of opium and heroin production in Thailand and Southeast Asia is deeply 
entangled with the complex political and military history of the region, and often 
indistinguishable.  Correspondingly, the time of the Second World War was an eventful 
and influential period for all nations on the Indochinese peninsula, and political 
machinations and military strategy often became inseparably entwined with the trade in 
illegal narcotics during this era.  
     A series of momentous events that exemplify this phenomenon began when Japan 
invaded and occupied British Burma in 1942.  With Japanese support, Thailand annexed 
a large swath of the Shan States, and Thai Field Marshall Phin Choonhavan assumed the 
role of military governor of the territory.  Suddenly in control of some of the most 
productive opium land in Southeast Asia, Field Marshall Phin made use of his close 




     The defeat of the Chinese nationalist forces in 1949 was another event that had great 
bearing on the future of Thailand and Burma, and the steady rise of opium production in 




 Regiments of the 93
rd
 
Division of the Kuomintang of China (KMT) refused to surrender and follow Chiang 
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   Dubbed “The Lost Army,” these soldiers fought their way out of 
Yunnan and across the border, where they took refuge in the Shan States of Burma.  
Sponsored as a Chinese “liberation army,” they eventually received reinforcements from 
Taiwan that swelled their numbers to around 12,000 troops by the end of 1953.
83
  
     Already allied with Field Marshall Phin and involved in the drug trade, the KMT 
seized control of Shan’s most fertile opium-producing areas, where they persuaded the 
tribal farmers to increase poppy cultivation.
84
  Settled in the Shan hills, the KMT forged 
an even closer, long-lasting commercial and military relationship with Field Marshall 
Phin.
85
  Sporadically attacking Chinese Communist troops in futile raids across the 
Chinese border, these KMT soldiers had the approval of the Thai government and the 
CIA, and were chiefly financed by the opium trade and Taiwan for many years.
86
   
     After 1961, when the Chinese Republic cut off nearly all funding for the far-flung 
units of the 93
rd
, most units that remained on the peninsula supported themselves 
exclusively through drug trafficking.
87
  For years, the KMT secured Burmese opium and 
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heroin exports to Thailand, where the Thai Army and Police helped Teochiu operatives 
ship them safely to their final destinations.
88
  
     After the majority of the KMT’s 93
rd
 Division was routed from the Shan region by 
tens of thousands of Chinese Communists and Burmese Army troops in January 1961, 
they fled south, and established new bases along the Thai border and in the hills of 
northern Thailand.  From their new positions, the KMT were able to effectively regulate 
trafficking routes and heavily tax opium heading to Thailand.
89
  Coordinating operations 
between these Thai-based units and about 6,000 of their troops that had managed to 




     In summary, Thailand’s powerful Teochiu community, Thai annexation of some of the 
most fertile opium-producing areas of the Shan States, Thai alliance with the KMT, and 
their own domestic opium production were all factors that combined to place Thailand 
prominently in the Golden Triangle drug trade.    
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     By 1946, Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that still maintained an 
official monopoly on domestic opium commerce.
91
  Supplemented by limited domestic 
production, the government trade had been sustained primarily by foreign imports for 
nearly a hundred years.  However, available imports became scarce in the 1940s and 
early 1950s due to wartime disruptions in global commerce and the sudden curtailment of 
Chinese and Iranian opium production.
92
  In order to shore up the supply, meet demand, 
and keep the treasury primed, the Thai government actively promoted opium poppy 




      Technically, opium cultivation had been legal in Thailand after 1855, but legitimate 
poppy growers were subject to severe governmental restriction and regulation.
94
  After 
nearly forty years of opium prohibition, King Mongkut finally established a royal opium 
franchise in Thailand in 1852, acquiescing to the colonial powers and economic forces 
that had been pushing huge quantities of opium to people all across Southeast Asia.
95
   
     Reminiscent of Britain and France, the Thai government aimed to buy low, sell high, 
and overflow state coffers with their opium monopoly.  Around the turn of the century, 
authorized growers became obliged to sell their wares to the newly formed Royal Opium 
Monopoly, often at artificially low prices.  But relatively onerous regulation and limited 
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government reimbursement incentivized clandestine opium cultivation, best suited to the 
secluded regions of the northern highlands.
96
   
     Prior to the 1940s, much of the clandestine opium production in the northern Thai hills 
was conducted by antecedents of the tribal people who joined them in greater numbers 
after World War II.   Opium farming was a cultural tradition for several of these different 
ethnic groups. They were agriculturalist tribes like the Hmong, Lahu, and Lisu among 
others, and practiced slash-and-burn, or swiddening techniques of agriculture.
97
  These 
farmers had the knowledge and skills necessary to avail themselves of the new 
government-sanctioned opportunity in the highlands, and Thai cultivation and opium 
production steadily rose through the late 1940s and early 1950s as a result.
98
 
     In addition to official production in the Thai hills, the British and the French had 
already been promoting opium production in Burma and Laos beginning a few years 
earlier.  Collectively, they drove up output on the Indochinese peninsula by 600 percent 
in four years, from 1940-1944.  Though output still remained at relatively low levels 
during this time compared to that of future years, production continued to steadily rise.
99
   
 
     For nearly three centuries, Southeast Asian opium users had been supplied mostly 
with product from India, Iran, Turkey and China.   But within the first decade after the 
war, due to the industry of highland farmers, enough opium was produced in Southeast 
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Asia so that the region could supply its burgeoning population of addicts independent of 
foreign imports.
100
   
     Aside from this dubious achievement, it is important to note that legalization and 
governmental advocacy of opium production across the Indochinese peninsula initiated a 
process that transformed the nature of highland agriculture in many tribal communities.  
As a result, populations of highland farmers in these communities transitioned from 




     In addition to officially directing the further entrenchment of poppy cultivation and 
the opium industry in the northern hills from the 1940s until 1959, the Thai government’s 
aggressive reforestation of fallow rice fields in the region represented another mid-
twentieth century policy that eventually resulted in increased illicit crop cultivation.
102
   
Reforestation reduced the amount of available paddy land, and eventually created a 
significant shortage of rice production in the Thai hills.
103
  Similar to illicit crop 
producers everywhere who experience food scarcity and food insecurity, the highland 
tribes in Thailand responded by growing more opium poppy for cash to buy food.  Opium 
cultivation enabled these subsistence farmers to earn enough cash to buy the rice that they 
were unable to grow for themselves due to the decreased availability of paddy land.  
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     Through their reforestation operations, the Thai government not only reenergized 
illicit production in the highlands, but also reinforced rural dependency on opium as a 
vital cash crop.  These conclusions are generally supported by the UNODC, which found 
that the level of opium poppy cultivation in Southeast Asia is directly influenced by the 
amount of paddy land available for rice cultivation.
104
  
     Another dynamic, commonly found in remote drug-producing regions, involves poor 
farmers who annually need to borrow money in order to finance operations at the start of 
a new farming cycle.  In many cases, local lenders will only loan money for the 
cultivation of lucrative drug crops, not food crops.  In Thailand, they often insisted on in-
kind repayment of the loan in opium.
105
  This dictate also bolstered illicit crop cultivation 
in the northern hill country.  
 
     By the 1960s and 1970s, large-scale opium production was well established in the 
highlands of Thailand, reinforced and driven by some typical environmental factors.  
Poverty, food insecurity and food scarcity, a lack of economic development and legal 
alternatives in the region, and the remote and undeveloped nature of the geography itself 
were all conditions that predominated in the northern highlands of Thailand.  All of these 
characteristics conform to the ideal type of a drug-producing region or nation, and create 
a setting highly conducive to illicit crop cultivation and drug production.  Fortunately, 
there were also other positive conditions and attitudes inherent in Thailand that 
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eventually enabled the government to successfully reduce widespread illicit cultivation in 
the hill country. 
 
 
                                Slow and Steady Change in the Thai Highlands 
 
     The government of Thailand became more concerned about highland development 
and tribal activity in the 1950s, primarily for reasons of national security.  They began to 
worry about the estrangement of the hill people from Thai society and their possible 
inclination to sympathize with militant insurgents spilling over the border from Laos.
106
  
In 1965, the loyalty of the hill tribes became an even more pressing concern in Thailand 
after a violent homegrown guerilla movement emerged from its training grounds in the 
forests and mountains of the northeastern highlands.
107
 
     Prior to that time, poverty and a lack of development in the hills had preserved the 
cultural isolation of the tribes, and their alienation was augmented by an adversarial 
tension with government officials.  Mutual animosity had also increased when the Royal 
Forest Department (RFD) intensified reforestation operations in tribal agricultural 
areas.
108
  Eventually, widespread illegal opium production in the northern hills became a 
concern after national prohibition in 1959.  
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     Through the intervening years, from 1959 to 1965, a hodgepodge of various special 
projects were set up through designated governmental departments for highland 
development and tribal welfare, but there was no overarching grand strategy for 
comprehensive highland development.  Committees came and went, but no real headway 
was made.   
     Finally, the Thai government asked the international community for assistance in 
researching the highland tribes, and commenced an in-depth study of socioeconomic 
conditions among the hill tribes in 1965-1966.
109
  The following year, in 1967, the UN 
conducted a survey to investigate the socioeconomic needs of people in the opium-
growing regions of northern Thailand.
110
  Thus began a longstanding alliance between the 
Thai government, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), international donors, and the highland tribes of northern Thailand.  
 
     Although there were many important contributors, no one was more consequential to 
the success of the country’s AD projects and opium reduction initiatives than King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand.  King Bhumibol took a strong early interest in highland 
development beginning in the late 1950s.
111
  Aside from concerns about national security, 
he appeared to genuinely care about the welfare of the people living in the hills.  
Beginning in the late 1960s, his frequent visits to the region to meet and talk with the 
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     But the King was not simply an effective goodwill ambassador with a soft heart.  He 
was also a true visionary in regard to several different aspects of alternative development 
and the necessary requirements for progress and successful opium reduction in the 
northern highlands.  To begin with, King Bhumibol had the foresight to realize that the 
establishment of effective and sustainable alternative development in the region was a 
long-term proposition.  In 1982, the King told a dismayed high UN official, accustomed 
to bureaucratic deadlines and expedited results, that His Majesty believed it would take at 
least thirty years to complete the task of establishing effective AD.
113
  Whether or not the 
King’s timetable was precisely accurate, he correctly realized that an area as wild and 
undeveloped as the northern Thai hill country required an extended commitment for the 
successful design and implementation of a comprehensive AD regime.   
     At the start of the process, there were no roads into the hills, and the people had no 
schools or organized health care.  Tribal highlanders were not official citizens, did not 
speak the Thai language, and had no formal relationship with the Thai economy 
whatsoever.  No one knew what alternative crops might potentially suffice as workable 
replacements for opium in the highlands, and their ultimate viability would require 
relatively sophisticated standardization, commercialization, and marketing, not to 
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mention roads for trucking the produce out of the hills.
114
   The obstacles loomed large, 
far too large to expect quick results.   
     Revered King Bhumibol provided a patient and constant moral leadership in Thailand 
that helped make opium replacement a national priority through the years.  As such, the 
Thai government and the private sector invested heavily in the project.  In the 1970s, 
international donors and NGOs followed suit, donating hundreds of millions of dollars to 
the effort in Thailand.
115
   
     A prime example of King Bhumibol’s visionary outlook on alternative development 
was his resolute involvement of the hill people in decision-making processes, and he 
repeatedly stressed the importance of their participation in all aspects of the AD 
programs.  Perhaps partly borne of the genuine affection that he had for the highlanders, 
his was also a keenly pragmatic stance.  Apparently devoid of bureaucratic arrogance, he 
knew that if the highlanders didn’t like what was coming down the pike, a program 
simply wouldn’t work.  Beginning in 1972, the King brought government officials from 




     Again, the King was ahead of the pack.  It wasn’t until about 1980 that development 
agencies around the world reassessed their failures, and Robert Chambers and his 
associates devised a process known as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA).  Chambers 
had concluded that many development projects had failed in the past due to an elite top-
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down dominance that excluded input from the rural inhabitants of a given area.  PRA was 
a dramatic revelation to many involved with international development, and it became an 
influential new paradigm.
117
   
 
        One set of interrelated variables that is closely associated with drug crop cultivation 
includes armed conflict, instability, and a lack of authoritative state control.  These 
characteristics plague nearly all major drug-producing countries.  Correspondingly, illicit 
crop farming in the rugged Thai highlands took place in a rough and unstable 
environment during its heyday.  Apart from battles with insurgents affiliated with the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), highland Hmong occasionally engaged government 
troops in armed conflict through the late 1960s and early 1970s.
118
 
     The Thai government worried that routine confrontation and animosity between 
officials and highland tribesmen could play into the hands of CPT rebels and push the hill 
tribes into the ranks of the insurgency.  But from an early stage, the government also 
recognized that developing the highlands could be an effective way to insulate hill tribes 
from a susceptibility to guerilla recruitment.  If poor highland farmers were given a better 
standard of living, the opportunity cost of joining guerilla activity might become 
discouragingly high.   
     Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Thailand steadily built a movement within the 
nation that acquired a powerful momentum after a military crackdown on student 
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demonstrators and consequent seizure of power in October 1976.
119
  The insurgency 
spread from the northeast to other regions of the country and added armed cadres at a rate 
averaging 6 to 10 percent per year.  At the close of 1978, the movement had almost 
14,000 armed troops located in 52 of Thailand’s 72 provinces, with tens of thousands 
more active supporters around the country.
120
 
     For the government of Thailand, securing the northern highland region became an 
objective that was crucial to ending the insurgency.  Guerilla base camps operated in the 
sheltered wilds of the northlands, and rebels could also mount attacks and then run across 
the border for sanctuary in neighboring Laos.  The long northern border with Laos had 
been beyond effective Thai government control and had provided domestic rebel access 
to supplies and support from the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.  In order to end the 
insurgency, it was essential that the Thai government secure the border area and deny 




     Finally, around 1979, the Thai government began to reformulate its counter-
insurgency strategy.  In the early eighties, policy guidelines were issued by the prime 
minister that deemphasized militarization and introduced a redoubled effort to better 
develop the northern highlands as well as other impoverished rural regions of the country.  
In an attempt to undercut popular support for the rebels, action was taken to expel corrupt 
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provincial officials and introduce new socioeconomic programs to help the rural poor in 
Thailand.
122
   
     The new guidelines also offered amnesty for insurgents who would lay down their 
arms and defect.  Defectors were invited to become “participants in Thai national 
development,” and were promised safety and a preservation of their civil rights.  They 
were even promised funds to help them assimilate into civilian society.
123
   
     Such overtures were calculated to exploit an increased hardship the insurgency was 
experiencing at that time.  At that point the CPT had been undergoing a traumatic 
factionalization of their movement that was causing confused disorganization and 
lowered morale.  Meanwhile China, their primary financier, had established diplomatic 
relations with Thailand in 1975 and discontinued CPT funding.
124
  
     In conjunction with the ideological disarray of the CPT, infighting, and a sudden loss 
of most funding, the government’s amnesty program was timed for maximum effect.  
Along with an easing of armed governmental provocation due to revised Thai military 
tactics, these factors led to very limited organized guerilla activity in Thailand by the mid 
1980s.
125
   An end to insurgent activity and violence in the highland areas meant that 
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alternative development projects had an opportunity to proceed more effectively, in a 
peaceful and stable environment. 
 
     It is apparent that Thailand entered a new phase in its consideration and treatment of 
the highlands and highland peoples, starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  From this 
time forward, many AD initiatives in the northern highlands began to address the drivers 
of illicit cultivation.   
     From this time, one is able to trace the slow process of remediating a lack of 
alternatives for highland farmers through crop replacement and infrastructure 
development programs.  The area gradually became less and less physically, culturally, 
and economically isolated as roads were constructed and relationships with mainstream 
Thai society were forged.  Highlanders began to increasingly participate with government 
officials and other professionals through projects in health care, education, agriculture 
and marketing.  Importantly, the causes of poverty, food scarcity and food insecurity 
were either directly or indirectly challenged by the majority of Thai AD programs 
through the years.  
    Initiatives that effectively targeted the main drivers of highland opium production in 
Thailand were backed by a strong and enduring national and international political 
commitment, and complemented by a crucial dedication to adequate financing.  This was 
a decisive combination of factors that helped steadily drive Thailand’s successful efforts 
to end opium production in the hill country.   
     Financing was significantly abetted by decades of tremendous growth in the Thai 
economy after World War II.  At 12 percent growth per annum, Thailand had one of the 
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fastest growing economies in the world by 1989.
126
  Healthy state coffers enabled the 
Thai government to generously augment considerable international donations and 
unwaveringly finance continual alternative development in the highland areas.
127
  
     In sum, all of the major negative environmental characteristics that perpetuate drug 
production in illicit crop growing areas were successfully addressed in Thai AD 
initiatives – geographic remoteness and lack of infrastructure, armed conflict and 
instability, lack of state control and authority, and food insecurity and a lack of viable 
alternatives to growing opium as a cash crop.  Though there were mistakes and misfires, 
a combination of well-targeted programs that worked to comprehensively mitigate the 
negative drivers of highland opium production was key to successful efforts in Thailand.   
     The campaign was bolstered by a strong national determination to end opium 
production in the northlands, actively promoted by key figures in Thai society, and 
underwritten by the rapid economic growth enjoyed by the nation after World War II.  
Consequently, the Thai government and international donors maintained a high level of 
commitment and consistent financing for AD projects through the years. The patience 
and sincerity to steadily endorse and adequately finance the projects over a long-term 
period was essential to a positive outcome in the Thai highlands.   
      Together, the Thai government, international developers, and NGOs designed 
projects and pioneered methods for the effective implementation of AD programs that 
have substantially influenced subsequent thinking and efforts in illicit crop control 
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around the world.  In many ways, the Thai model has served to define the basic concept 
of alternative development.
128
   
     One of the most influential aspects of the Thai model was the participatory nature of 
the projects and programs.  The Thai AD efforts ultimately served to validate the PRA 
development paradigm as ideal examples of success in the field.   
     Finally, in order to reduce harm and create a more effective drug control regime, many 
experts feel that it is sensible to only engage in the forced eradication of illicit crops as a 
last resort, after farmers have had ample time and opportunity to avail themselves of 
well-established alternative livelihoods.  At the very least, the destruction of illicit crops 
without adequate alternatives for the farmers causes instability, increased poverty, 
increased food insecurity and misery.   
     Historically, governments have often placed the highest priority on political 
expediency and destroyed the crops of desperate peasants who have not had access to 
alternative means of livelihood.  The repercussions of such ill-advised actions will be 
explored in some of the following case studies. 
    Avoiding a premature reliance on forced crop eradication in the Thai highlands 
allowed for the continuation of stable and enduring progress in the reduction of illicit 
cultivation in Thailand.  The selective eradication of highland opium fields didn’t begin 
until 1984, and then only in areas where it was concluded that inhabitants had been 
provided with adequate access to feasible alternatives.
129
  Once again, King Bhumibol 
deserves some credit for advocating abstinence from forced eradication in the highlands 
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until alternative development and crop replacement programs had been given sufficient 




     It should be acknowledged that even at its zenith, Thai opium production was always 
well below that of its highland neighbors, Laos and Burma.  Thailand’s primary 
importance in the ad hoc alliance was as a global trafficking outlet for regional opiate 
production, and home to criminal masterminds, financiers and kingpins – the logistical 
nerve center of the Golden Triangle.
131
  Thailand had the infrastructure to truck the drugs 
down out of the remote wilds of the Burmese and Laotian highlands, and ship them out to 
global consumers.  Also unique to the region at the time, Thailand had a modern banking 
system that could accommodate the multi-million dollar drug deals.
132
   
     Although their illegal opium production was significant in its prime, relatively modest 
output surely made illicit crop control an easier endeavor in Thailand than it could ever 
be in Burma, even in the best of circumstances.  Be that as it may, illicit Thai production 
of opium was a widespread and serious problem in the country’s highlands, and virtual 
suppression of the illegal crop in Thailand is an impressive and potentially instructive 
achievement.   
     In further discussion of countries far beyond the Golden Triangle that have tried and 
failed to sustain reductions in illicit crop cultivation, and in the following case study of 
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                                                Laos: Caught in the Middle 
 
    With Thailand to the west and Burma to the northwest, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic is positioned as one of the three countries of the notorious Golden Triangle.  As 
such, post-World War II opium and heroin production in Laos has been largely defined 
by relationships with its partners in the triad, as well as with the other former French 
colonies in Indochina.  But while it shares some cultural characteristics and historical 
experiences with various neighbors on the Indochinese peninsula, Laos has also 
experienced distinctive events and circumstances that have shaped its patterns of opium 
and heroin production over the years, and contributed to specific reasons for its failure to 
sustain reductions in illicit crop cultivation.  
 
     Colonial subjugation is an indelible and dramatically influential experience in any 
nation’s history.  In Laos, decisions and operations undertaken by the imperial powers 
during and after the colonial era left a disadvantageous heritage of political conflict, war, 
and drug production that continues today.  Across the Indochinese peninsula, the seeds of 
similar cultural legacies were sown long before the official appropriation of regional 
territory by France in the late nineteenth century.
133
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     Foreshadowing the French colonial period, Jesuit missionaries arrived in Tonkin 
(North Vietnam) in 1627, steadily followed by contingents of eager traders and explorers 
through the years.  Members of many generations of French had already established 
themselves in the region by the time the boundaries of the Union indochinoise were 
formally delineated in 1887.
134
   
     Hence, French expansion in the area had not originally been a deliberate state agenda.  
It had instead transpired mostly through a series of individual actions and piecemeal 
conquests staged by assorted French explorers and adventurers over several generations.  
Sometimes armed intervention was at least partially instigated by the political 
entanglements of Catholic missionaries.  But whatever the case, as Southeast Asian 
territory slowly accumulated, the attendant economic and political investments of more 
and more Frenchmen progressively entrenched French state interests in the area over the 
course of more than two centuries.
135
   
 
     During the Napoleonic era, as France articulated stronger economic and political 
aspirations for an empire that would rival that of Great Britain, more deliberate and direct 
state policy guided a series of military operations that culminated in the annexation of 
Saigon in 1862, Cambodia in 1863, and central Vietnam and Tonkin (northern Vietnam) 
in 1883 and 1884 respectively.
136
  Laos was added in 1893, after Siam ceded the territory 
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to France following defeat in the Franco-Siamese War earlier that year.
137
  In order to 
defray the expense of Southeast Asian conquest, the French quickly established an opium 
franchise within six months of taking Saigon.
138
    
     The French already had a large established clientele for their opium in Vietnam. Aside 
from a growing number of native smokers, the many Chinese that had migrated south in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries from Kwangtung and Fukien provinces 
had brought a robust opium habit to Vietnam along with their valuable expertise in 
business and commerce.
139
   Largely comprised of the Chinese merchant class, there were 
already large populations of opium smokers in the cities of Hanoi, Hue, and Saigon when 
the French arrived to take control.
140
   
     Like the British, the French endeavored to maintain and exploit their colonial opium 
monopolies for maximum revenue potential.  In the late nineteenth century, the various 
state monopolies across French Indochina were consolidated under the powerful Régie de 
l’Opium, and a large opium refinery was established in Saigon to process huge quantities 
of raw opium into readily smokable commercial products.  A new mixture was 
manufactured that burned at a faster rate than regular opium, thereby inducing smokers to 
increase their consumption and buy more.  In addition, cheaper opium was brought in 
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     The opium business was brisk in French Indochina during the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, with thousands of opium dens and retail shops in operation.  But 
World War II dramatically interrupted global trade relations, and the French began to 
have difficulty importing the lucrative commodity from the usual sources.   
     After France was taken by Germany, and the Japanese occupied Indochina, the French 
colonial bureaucracy that was allowed to continue administration became increasingly 
concerned with averting a fiscal crisis caused by significantly decreased opium revenue.  
Taxes on opium only provided about 15 percent of colonial revenue at this time, down 
from more than 30 percent around the turn of the century.
142
  Similar to conclusions 
reached by the Thai and the British who were also affected by wartime disruptions to 
opium imports, the French decided that the only recourse was to encourage greater opium 
production in the highlands of their Southeast Asian colonies in order to supply regional 
demand and increase the flow of revenue streams. 
 
     The ethnic tribes that produced opium in the highlands of French Indochina were 
many of the same tribes that had migrated to the hills of Thailand and Burma, namely the 
Lisu, Lahu, Akha, Yao, and Hmong tribes.
143
  The Hmong had populated the uplands of 
Tonkin and Laos by the thousands in the mid-nineteenth century, fleeing an escalated 
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bloody persecution in Southwestern China that had started in the Manchu Dynasty some 
two hundred years earlier.
144
  By the time of World War II, the Hmong had been 
supplementing French colonial opium stores for a long time.  However, tribesmen had 
repeatedly resisted French demands for increased opium production and French attempts 
to halt the diversion of stocks via smuggling, violently attacking French garrisons and 
fomenting bloody revolt when provoked.
145
 
     Now however, the French felt that they had no choice but to bend the Hmong to their 
will.  The colonial authorities feared that if they failed to boost revenues through a 
reinvigorated opium economy, the impending financial shortfall would jeopardize the 
viability of their entire Southeast Asian venture.  They believed that solvency hinged 
upon increased Hmong opium production and diminished smuggling in the Hmong 
regions.  Therefore, with trepidation in many quarters, the desperate imperialists devised 
strategic approaches to deal with the contentious Hmong tribesmen in Laos and Tonkin. 
     In Laos, the French simply backed one powerful clan leader over another in the 
foremost Hmong political center, Nong Het.
146
  The ingratiated victor, Touby Lyfoung of 
the Ly clan, dutifully raised the annual head tax from three to eight silver piasters.  
Realizing that the sum of the stiff new tax was unattainable for many Hmong, Touby 
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thoughtfully allowed that the obligation could alternatively be met with the payment of 
three kilograms of opium.  Since the previous average per capita harvest had probably 
been less than a kilogram, opium production suddenly spiked across all the Hmong 
regions of northern Laos.
147
 
     In Tonkin, by contrast, the French had long been frustrated by a lack of consolidated 
Hmong population centers and a dearth of tribal political organization.  There simply 
were not any political strongmen among the Hmong groups there for the colonialists to 
co-opt.  But the ethnic Tai that populated the lowland valleys maintained effective control 
over most of the markets and commerce in the region, so the French focused on an 
alliance with powerful White Tai and Black Tai leaders in Tonkin.  This proved to be a 
successful strategy for the imperial power, at least in regard to achieving the task at hand.  
After 1940, Tai leaders were substantially rewarded by the French for coercing the 
Hmong to produce increased volumes of opium in the highlands of Tonkin.
148
 
     The decisions and maneuvers undertaken by the French during this time in order to 
stimulate increased opium production in Laos and Tonkin had tremendous cultural and 
political repercussions in Southeast Asia over the following decades.  For example, by 
engineering this particular solution to wartime opium shortages in Indochina, the French 
reinforced the fateful process that eventually transformed the highland economy in much 
of their jurisdiction from one based on subsistence agriculture to one based on farming 
opium as a cash crop.
149
  This was an essential antecedent phenomenon that facilitated 
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the exponentially increased opium production and heroin manufacture in the Golden 
Triangle in the 1960s.    
 
     French policies and tactics developed to boost opium production after the outbreak of 
World War II also produced ramifications that factored dramatically into both of the 
Indochina Wars.  In Laos, the way that the colonialists had favored Touby Lyfoung over 
the other clan’s leader, Lo Faydang, made enemies of the loser and his many clansmen.  
Consequently, Faydang was able to persuade many Hmong to follow him to Vietnam 
where they aligned with the Viet Minh against the French.  Over time, he continued to 
successfully enlist Hmong for the Viet Minh, allegedly using the issue of Touby’s 
onerous opium tax as a recruiting tool.
150
 
     Eventually Faydang became an important leader for the Pathet Lao, and during the 
Second Indochina War he led thousands of communist guerilla fighters against nearly 
thirty thousand CIA-backed Hmong mercenaries affiliated with Touby Lyfoung.
151
  By 
propping up and privileging one clan leader over the leader of a rival clan, the French had 
amplified and deepened natural political divisions in the highland Hmong communities 
throughout Laos and much of Indochina.  This division played out in bitterly opposed 
Hmong alliances during both Indochina Wars.   
     Colonial arrangements to secure increased postwar opium output in Tonkin proved 
even more pivotal to the fate of France’s tenure in Southeast Asia than their activity in 
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Laos.  In 1954, as the First Indochina War dragged on, the French decided to put all their 
chips on a battle in the remote mountains of northwestern Tonkin.  There they planned a 
major defeat for the Viet Minh, in the valley of Dien Bien Phu.  But the surrounding 
mountains were populated by Hmong who despised the French for having employed the 
Tai to oppress them, and cheat and underpay them for their opium for so many years.   
     Prior to battle, thousands of these anti-French Hmong reportedly assisted the Viet 
Minh in establishing the best and most strategic positions on the mountain ridges around 
Dien Bien Phu, from which they delivered the fatal blow.  Motivated by their acquired 
animosity for the colonialists, the Hmong of northwestern Tonkin helped the Viet Minh 





     Before the French denouement at Dien Bien Phu, Laos had been granted semi-
autonomy in 1950, and full independence as a constitutional monarchy in October, 
1953.
153
  Subsequently, the government struggled for years to unify opposing political 
interests amidst domestic and regional upheaval. 
     French defeat in Indochina ushered in an era of more direct involvement for the 
United States government in its mission to contain communism in Southeast Asia.  But 
along with pre-drawn lines of engagement, the US also inherited an environment that 
contained resilient subcultures and coveted illicit enterprises based on opium, and 
increasingly, on heroin production.  Eventually elements of the US government would 
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find it expedient to either passively allow or actively facilitate the drug trade in Laos, the 
Golden Triangle, and other regions of Indochina in order to further several different 
political and military objectives. 
     Bordering both communist North Vietnam and China, Laos was viewed by US 
government policymakers as a critical “buffer state” in the post-World War II era, 
safeguarding the status of Thailand and the rest of noncommunist Southeast Asia.
154
  
Likewise interested in maintaining a friendly government in South Vietnam, after 1954 
American strategists began to devise policy that initiated a more forthright involvement 
in the former French colonies to buttress the containment of communism in Southeast 
Asia.  In Laos, initially this meant US support for the Royal Lao Army against the Pathet 
Lao.  But after the communists enjoyed a surprising election victory in 1958, US 
policymakers decided to hedge their bets.   
     Frightened by the left’s success, the US responded by using the CIA to finance the 
formation of a hardline right-wing coalition in Laos, as they curtailed all foreign aid to 
the neutralist administration.  The swift result of the latter action was a fiscal crisis that 
forced Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his government to resign shortly thereafter, 
clearing the way for a new right-wing prime minister to assume power.
155
   
     The atmosphere in Laos remained tumultuous through a series of coups and 
countercoups over the next several years, as Laos descended into full-blown civil war 
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  In that same year, the CIA began to organize a clandestine anti-
communist guerilla army in the Laotian hinterlands, and they identified a young Hmong 
Laotian Army officer named Vang Pao as the man they needed to help them do it.
157
    
     CIA operatives began flying Vang Pao to a series of scattered Hmong villages in the 
highlands west and north of the Plain of Jars, offering rice, guns, and money for rebel 
recruits.  And everywhere they went, they carved out some kind of a crude landing strip 
on the mountain hillside, linking all the remote highland enclaves under their control.
158
  
Later, in 1963-1964, the CIA and Vang Pao used this same technique to gain a foothold 
high in the Hmong mountain villages that were deep inside Pathet Lao territory in Sam 
Neua Province in northeast Laos.
159
 
     By 1961 US strategists had considered Laos the main security crisis in Southeast 
Asia.
160
  Thus, clandestine operations were undertaken through which the CIA funneled 
weapons and supplies to right-wing hardliners in Laos,
161
 and continued to train and arm 
tribal commando units in the hills.  Meanwhile, President Kennedy publically insisted to 
the American people and the international community that “We seek no wider conflict in 
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  Contrary to Kennedy’s zealous appeals, biographer and historian 
Thomas Reeves confirms, “In Laos Jack approved a ‘secret war’ that for years spread 
mayhem and death throughout the strife-torn nation.”
163
 
     Ravaged by political chaos and civil war, Laos was eventually drawn into the Second 
Indochina War.  The Pathet Lao’s North Vietnamese benefactors had chosen to 
increasingly route the majority of their southbound troops and materiel through the 
country over what became known as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail,”
164
 drawing maximum US 
attention to Laos as a critical battleground.  By 1964 the US would secretly commence a 
ferocious bombing campaign over Laos that would further entrap the country in the 
horror of the Second Indochina War, and thoroughly terrorize and destabilize the 
population for many years to come.  
 
   
                      The Laotian Labyrinth: The Nexus of Opium and Conflict  
                                    in Late Twentieth Century Southeast Asia         
 
 
     Opium traffic out of Laos had been largely controlled by Corsican syndicates since the 
First Indochina War in the late-1940s, when affiliates in Marseille and Saigon 
coordinated the smuggling of gold, currency, and narcotics between the two ports.
165
  The 
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Corsicans were quick to use the airstrips that Vang Pao and his cohorts had roughed out 




     But when General Ouane Rattikone emerged as one of the top leaders to survive the 
Laotian coups and countercoups of 1964 and 1965, he decided to eliminate Corsican 
competition in the drug trade by denying them the documents required to access Laotian 
airports.  During his management of the semiofficial Laotian Opium Administration for 
right-wing leader General Phoumi Nosavan beginning in 1962, General Ouane had 
pioneered the arrangement of regular Burmese opium caravans into Laos.
167
  Now he was 
eager to maximize the potential of the opium trade in Laos free from competition.   
     It was a case of poor timing for the General, however.  By 1965 the Laotian air force 
was stretched to capacity with increased fighting on the Plain of Jars and heavy bombing 
of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos.
168
  The supreme Laotian air force commander 
refused to allow the diversion of any aircraft for opium transport.  
     At the same time, many of the 30,000-some highland Hmong enlisted by Vang Pao 
and the CIA depended on cash from regular opium sales to the Corsicans.  Ample 
American rice drops to these allied tribes had served to incentivize an increased 
dedication of labor and land to poppy cultivation and opium production in these areas.
169
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     With little other air transport operating in much of the country, the CIA-controlled Air 
America airline began to collect the Hmong opium harvests, primarily throughout 
northeastern Laos, sometime around 1965.  These transports routinely delivered their 
illicit cargo to Vang Pao at a secret base in Long Tieng.
170
  
     The CIA is alleged to have regularly transported Hmong opium out of the Laotian 
hills to the base at Long Tieng on Air America transports until sometime in 1971.
171
  
After the CIA and USAID gave Vang Pao financial assistance to form his own airline in 




     In due course, with the assistance of an expert chemist from China, Vang Pao opened 
a heroin laboratory at Long Tieng in 1970.  Sources claim that the lab became so 
profitably productive that the main direction of transport was eventually reversed, with 
supplemental opium regularly purchased and flown from Vientiane to Long Tieng for 
conversion to heroin.
173
  The final destination for all Long Tieng produced heroin is not 
known, but it is alleged that at least part of these exports were shipped out to supply the 
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     By comparison, in northwest Laos along the border with Burma, China, and Thailand, 
the character of the modern drug trade was greatly influenced by the victory of the 
Chinese Communists in 1949, and the subsequent activities of remaining KMT forces in 
the Burmese Shan States and Thailand after 1961.  Shortly after the Nationalist loss in 




 Regiments of the KMT 93
rd
 Division 
as they conducted cross-border operations into China and involved themselves in opium 
production and traffic out of Burma.  But by this time the KMT had already been 
involved in opium production for many years.   
     The production and traffic of Manchurian opium partially financed Japanese military 
forays into China in the 1930s, and during World War II the Japanese had financed their 
occupying army in Guangdong by trafficking low-grade heroin purchased from the 
Chinese Nationalists.
175
  After promoting Thai annexation of the Shan States during 
World War II, the Japanese encouraged resident Thai Northern Army commander and 
acting military governor, General Phin Choonhavan, to forge mutually profitable 
relations with the KMT.  After their defeat in 1949, the straggling holdout regiments of 
the KMT fled to the bountiful Shan States, where they parlayed their connections into 
control of the most prime opium producing areas in Southeast Asia.
176
 
     After 1949, the CIA hired Shan leader U Ba Thein to train Lahu tribesmen as 
commandos to protect KMT and CIA border outposts inside Burma from Burmese Army 
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patrols and government militias.
177
  Fleeing Burma after the start of the 1958 Shan 
national revolution, Thein eventually settled in Muong Sing in northwest Laos.   
     From there, he continued to arrange CIA supply and personnel transport to and from 
the Burmese outposts along the Chinese border via Shan rebel opium caravans, which 
were a safer alternative to sending Air America flights into potentially hostile territory.  
Eventually, through these caravans, Thein arranged a series of arms-for-opium deals with 
General Ouane Rattikone, who had access to the surplus of weapons supplied to the 
Laotian Army by the United States.
178
   
     In summary, most of the opium and heroin trade in northwest Laos involved the KMT, 
trained ethnic commandos in the Shan States of neighboring Burma, and elements of the 
Laotian military.  All of these players and their drug trafficking activities were directly 
tied to US foreign policy positions, CIA espionage operations against China, and other 
anti-communist operations in Southeast Asia. 
     It should be noted that the Shan rebels really only controlled a small fraction of the 
opium trekked out of Burma at this time, with the well-entrenched KMT trafficking the 
lion’s share of the output through their control of regional caravans.  After the majority of 
the 93
rd
 were routed from their turf in the Shan region by Burmese and Chinese troops in 
1961, they maintained their control from just over the border across the Mekong River, 
first in Laos, then in Thailand.
179
  Even after their decisive defeat in the so-called “1967 
Opium War” at the hands of the relentless General Ouane, the KMT purportedly still 
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managed to maintain control of about 90 percent of Burmese exports, with the Shan 




     The scene of the famous 1967 Opium War was set when ambitious Shan warlord 
Chan Shee-fu launched a colossal sixteen-ton opium caravan bound for Laos, intended to 
fill an order placed by General Ouane Rattikone.
181
  Anxious to preserve their dominance 
in the trade, KMT leaders sent over a thousand troops into Burma to intercept this 300-
packhorse caravan and its 500 armed escorts.  But the Shan managed to get across the 
Mekong into Laos, where they dug in and prepared to battle their pursuers.
182
  
     By this date, General Ouane Rattikone had the unchecked ability to employ the 
Laotian air force as he pleased, having conspired with other military leaders to oust the 
pious air force commander who had placed a higher priority on the achievement of 
national military objectives than on accommodation of the General’s drug deals.  So in 
1967, after KMT and Shan forces clashed in Laos and battled for days resulting in no 
clear advantage for either side, General Ouane was moved to enter the fray.  With little 
restraint, the General simply pounded the entire theater with a squadron of North 
American T-28s, mopping up with his Second Paratroop Battalion, who collected the 
sixteen tons of opium on behalf of the General, presumably gratis.
183
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     In the wake of the confrontation Chan Shee-fu never regained his former prominence, 
and henceforth the KMT was obliged to make some concessions to General Ouane, who 
emerged as one of the premier heroin manufacturers in the Golden Triangle.
184
  The 
incident highlighted the extent to which various regional government and insurgent 
military organizations were involved with the opium trade.  The episode was also notable 
because it involved a struggle for control over illegal Burmese drug exports between 
three different entities that had each been empowered by some measure of US 
government support.   
 
     On June 6, 1971, The New York Times reported what they had learned from a leaked 
classified CIA document concerning opium traffic in Southeast Asia.  The CIA had 
identified twenty-one opium refineries in the tri-border area of the Golden Triangle, 
including seven labs that were capable of processing high-grade No. 4 heroin.  Many of 
these refineries were located in areas controlled by US allies, including KMT forces and 
Yao mercenaries for the CIA.  One of the major labs in Ban Houei Sai, Laos was 
apparently owned by General Ouane Rattikone, who allegedly also sponsored a major lab 
in the Vientiane region.
185
   
     The facts surrounding opium production, heroin processing and drug trafficking 
during the Second Indochina War are not entirely clear.  Likewise, the extent of CIA and 
US government involvement in the drug trade during this time has been difficult to 
ascertain.  However, the fundamentals of the situation are evident.  The basic history that 





 Ibid., 248. 
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is widely accepted if not beyond dispute in some quarters, is that the CIA helped promote 
the opium trade in northeastern Laos and the surrounding area in order to support allied 
Hmong guerilla commandos in the northeastern highlands.   
     Similarly, multiple sources corroborate US facilitation of opium traffic in the Golden 
Triangle region of northwest Laos stemming from longstanding CIA involvement with 
regiments of the 93
rd
 Division of the KMT and Shan tribal mercenaries who assisted US 
espionage activities focused on Red China.  US support for regular Burmese opium 
caravans entering Laos was also tacitly acquired through US support for the Royal 
Laotian Army, which at that time was the only foreign army in the world entirely 
financed by the US government.
186
   
     Correspondingly, as a right-wing stalwart and former commander in chief of the 
Laotian Army, General Ouane Rattikone enjoyed extraordinary latitude in the behavior 
that was tolerated by the CIA and the US government, who were principally concerned 
with maintaining allied support against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao.  The 
same can be said for Vang Pao, who apparently ran a brisk heroin manufacturing and 
trafficking network with a large degree of US complicity.   
     General Ouane and Vang Pao can be seen in this light as positioned in a long line of 
unsavory bedfellows that the US indulged as partners in the preeminent worldwide fight 
against Communism.  The downside repercussions from such indulgence were, inter alia, 
a further entrenchment of opium and heroin production in Southeast Asia and the 
continued growth and development of worldwide illegal drug distribution networks. 




     The importance of understanding this history is not simply to place blame for US 
government involvement in the opium and heroin trade in Southeast Asia.  Rather, 
tracing the pertinent specifics of US political and military engagement in Laos after 
World War II, and in Southeast Asia after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and 
the French defeat in the First Indochina War, informs an understanding of the evolution 
and depth of opium and heroin trafficking in Laos and the rest of the Golden Triangle.   
     In studying this period when several regional and international entities were 
desperately vying for power and influence in Southeast Asia, there emerges a portrait of 
Laos as a country that was becoming very deeply involved in the drug trade through the 
energetic commitment of many different vested interests.  
 
     As is often the case in illicit crop producing areas around the world, various 
government and rebel forces in Laos and the border regions found it irresistible to engage 
in opium and heroin trafficking in the post-World War II period.  Sometimes their 
involvement appears to have been primarily motivated by a desire to further military 
operations and political objectives, at least at first.  During the Second Indochina War 
however, aside from the expedient purchases of Hmong opium to maintain commando 
allegiance, it seems evident that illicit drug traffic by military entities of every stripe in 
Laos was most often motivated by bald-faced greed and desire for personal enrichment.  
     Research has shown that even when armed forces begin as relatively uncorrupted and 
ideologically motivated, whether they are rebels or government-affiliated troops, once 
they begin to self-finance through criminal enterprise they often steadily gravitate toward 




  This pattern of behavior has been documented in the conflict areas of 
major drug-producing regions from Southwest and Southeast Asia to South America. 
     Economist and author Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank have written 
about this dynamic: 
 
          Most entrepreneurs of violence have essentially political objectives, and 
          presumably initially undertake criminal activities only as a grim necessity to  
          raise finance. However, over time the daily tasks involved in running a  
          criminal business may tend inadvertently to develop a momentum of their  
          own. The organization attracts more criminal types and fewer idealists, so  
          that it may gradually change its character. Some rebel leaderships tend to do  





     This kind of gradual corruption of purpose appears to have occurred during the 
Indochina Wars with respect to forces aligned with the US, and it has been exhibited 
subsequently by various insurgent groups and their involvement in Laotian opium and 
heroin production since 1975. 
     Around the world and throughout history, soldiers involved in wars of insurgency and 
drug traffickers have operated hand in hand.  Symbiotic relationships presumably evolve 
because both groups must operate outside the law and develop clandestine networks of 
support.  Today, observers have witnessed transnational criminal networks increasingly 
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cooperating with localized insurgents, and collaborating with international terrorists as 
well.
189
   
     Similar to the activities of the KMT in the Golden Triangle, insurgent drug trafficking 
may be combined with espionage-related ventures or reconnaissance operations.  
Consequently, it eventually becomes very difficult for an observer to identify individual 
actors or groups as primarily either politically or criminally motivated.   
     Such conflation of purpose is tragic.  Because illegal drugs and contraband yield such 
high profit margins (especially when stolen or garnered at bargain prices through 
coercion), many involved officers and troops enjoy the bounty that the chaos of war 
provides and may act to protect their business interests by attempting to prevent or 
subvert any peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
            
     In reviewing the history of Laos, over the roughly one hundred year period from their 
beginning as a colony in French Indochina to the victory of the Pathet Lao in 1975, we 
can trace the process in which opium production is consistently sponsored and expanded, 
at times even coerced, by a wide variety of entities.  From the earlier exploitation of 
colonial monopolies and generations of traveling merchant caravans, to the airborne 
representatives of assorted state governments and criminal syndicates in the twentieth 
century, the Hmong and other tribes were encouraged at every turn to produce as much 
opium as they possibly could.   
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     The experience of Laos as a premier Cold War staging area and battleground for 
foreign-backed coups, proxy warfare, multiple insurgencies, variously-aligned 
commando mercenaries, and massive bombing raids thoroughly shattered Laotian society 
and created a wild and lawless environment that attracted a wide assortment of outlaw 
entrepreneurs and audacious government officials eager to procure opium, manufacture 
heroin, and pipeline it through the country. Laos suffered from an overabundance of 
crooked politicians and military officers, malign international businessmen, and self-
interested foreign agents.  By the second half of the
 
twentieth century many different 
powerful groups and individuals were developing vital interests in the opium and heroin 
economies of Laos and the Golden Triangle, and they worked hard to enable and expand 
their related enterprises.  
      Throughout the following decades, the methods of commercial opium farming, 
harvesting, processing, scheduling, equipment and product purchasing, warehousing, 
criminal networking, communications, banking and accounting, money laundering and 
investment, corruption and bribery, and illicit transport and trafficking became very 
deeply ingrained in much of Laotian society.  Tragically, the degree of societal 
involvement and the magnitude of systemic corruption and criminal behavior manifested 
by Laotian government and military involvement in the drug trade during the Indochina 
Wars promotes a severely dysfunctional society and corrupt institutional legacy that is 
very difficult to mitigate, much less terminate.
190
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In fact, much of the Laotian government and military corruption specifically identified 
here was routed wholesale from the seat of power, if not rendered inactive, when the 
Pathet Lao finally overran Vientiane in 1975.  However, much damage had been wrought 
by this time, and opium production practices, illicit networks, and trafficking 
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     In summary, the entrenchment of the illegal drug industry in late twentieth century 
Laos was made feasible by an unstable and lawless environment punctuated by 
insurgency, war, and a devastating US bombing campaign that secretly dropped the 
equivalent of a planeload of bombs every eight minutes, 24-hours a day, for nine straight 
years, from 1964-1973.
191
  In addition, the state was highly corrupt and maintained very 
weak authority in the hinterlands and many border areas.  Finally, the ethnic hill tribes in 
Laos that had some historic tradition of opium culture suffered from food insecurity and 
lived in remote and undeveloped wilderness areas where there was often little recourse to 
opium cultivation for their livelihood. 
     Conditions similar to these are apparent in most every case of illicit crop producing 
nation, from the Golden Triangle, to the Golden Crescent, to the Andean Nations of 
South America.  These defining attributes continue to affect Laos today and have enabled 





    
                                                                                                                                                 
infrastructure had become well established.  By the late eighties, the communists were 
collecting substantial state revenue from the drug trade in Laos (Tullis, 77). 
191
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                                                     Under the Pathet Lao   
 
     In 1975, the government in Vientiane finally fell to communist Pathet Lao forces.  
Since that time they have been a very secretive and insular government, exhibiting 
behavior typical of many one-party totalitarian states.  “Opaque” is a word that has often 
been used to describe Laotian government policy and operations.  Consequently, some of 
the specifics underlying recent spikes in opium production remain uncertain, but an 
examination of the facts that are known is telling enough. 
      
     The communist government has not made much progress in problem areas linked to 
illicit crop production since 1975, allowing for the recent resurgence of opium production 
in the country.  Laos is still one of the most undeveloped and poorest nations in the 
world, with subsistence agriculture constituting around 80 percent of the country’s 
employment.  This reality, coupled with the fact that only about 5 percent of the land in 
Laos is arable, presents the portrait of a country where vast segments of the population 
perpetually teeter on the edge of food insecurity and food scarcity.
192
  
     Many Laotian hill tribe communities continue to suffer from food scarcity, 
exacerbated by decades of intermittent insurgent activity and hostile military incursions 
in the far-flung northern highlands.
193
  The arrival of 30,000 North Vietnamese troops in 
Laos in 1977, at the behest of Vientiane, caused widespread alarm and fueled a variety of 
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foreign-backed insurgent groups in the country.  The event also sparked Hmong 
resistance in the central highland region.   
     Again, all of the Laotian societal conditions detailed above are commonly associated 
with illicit crop cultivation.  These characteristics include poverty, food insecurity, 
underdevelopment, insurgency and armed conflict. 
 
     Catalyzing resurgent opium production across the region, the skyrocketing Chinese 
economy has afforded countless scores of newly prospering Chinese the capacity to 
indulge in a variety of vices and contraband, including opium and heroin.  Big production 
increases in Laos and Myanmar in recent years are largely attributed to dramatically 
increased Chinese demand, with virtually the entire Southeast Asian opium crop exported 
to satisfy the Chinese heroin boom.
194
  With large numbers of hungry people in rural 
areas of Laos living on less than $1.25 per day, opportunity costs for resuming illicit crop 
production to feed Chinese demand appear very low.  In fact, it probably seems like a 
blessed opportunity in light of their dismal predicament.    
 
     Over the last decade, many observers predicted that unless more opium farmers were 
given viable alternatives in Southeast Asia, a return to illicit crop cultivation was likely.  
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In a 2007 New York Times article, author and opium expert Bernard Chouvy drew an 
unfavorable comparison between the aggressive forced eradications in Laos and 
Myanmar that were unaccompanied with sufficient alternatives for affected farmers, and 
the measured elimination of poppy production in Thailand over a thirty-year period.  
Chouvy noted that the Thai effort involved careful crop substitution and all-
encompassing AD programs in the highland areas, along with infrastructure development 
projects and education and health initiatives.
195
   
     Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of UNODC, had a similar sense of 
foreboding in 2006, indicating that the Laotian government was in dire need of sustained 




     But no support was forthcoming, and today many thousands of Laotians continue to 
reside in remote and undeveloped areas where there are no roads, several days journey 
from civilization.  Unlike in Thailand, these tribes have not been the beneficiaries of any 
transportation infrastructure or alternative development, and consequently they have few 
viable alternatives to producing opium.  The lack of roads negates the viability of farming 
alternative commercial crops to sell in lowland markets, and also makes the risk of 
random government patrols looking for poppy fields virtually nil. 
     Opium is the one crop that will pull buyers in, over hundreds of miles of rugged 
terrain, right to their little village.  Many of these far off hamlets are also relatively close 
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to the Mekong River, which is convenient for buyers to traffic the opium up to Myanmar 




     In order to analyze the causes of failed drug control in Laos, it is necessary to examine 
a few of the specific policies and actions that the Pathet Lao government has employed 
regarding opium suppression, remote ethnic populations, and rural development. 
     As opium production reached peak levels at the end of the eighties, international 
pressure on the government in Vientiane became more intense.  The Laotians were 
apparently amenable to reduction strategies, but rightly stressed that development should 
be a necessary prerequisite for opium eradication.  In the end, unrelenting pressure from 
the US and the UN finally pushed the Laotian government into a specific illicit crop 
reduction plan with a set timetable.
198
   
     Despite adoption of a UNDCP “Masterplan” for relatively rapid reduction of opium 
cultivation over the 1994-2000 period, dissatisfied UNDCP officials pressed the Laotian 
government to act even more aggressively to eradicate illicit crops and drive down the 
annual harvest statistics for the country.  High officials at the UNDCP offered $80 
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     Sufficiently incentivized, starting in 2002 government officials spent months scouring 
the Laotian highlands.  They went village by village, ordering the destruction of poppy 
fields, collecting stockpiled seeds, and levying fines for noncompliance.  The campaign 
achieved its immediate goal and opium yields soon plummeted.  By 2007 Laotian opium 
production had shrunk to only 1,500 hectares (9 tonnes), down from peak yields in 1989 
estimated at 42,130 hectares (380 tonnes).
200
 
     Diligent Laotian eradication did result in much-ballyhooed short-term reductions of 
illicit crop cultivation, but without adequate AD it also exacerbated some fundamental 
drivers of drug production, namely poverty and food insecurity.  It also served to further 
delegitimize and weaken the government’s writ in affected areas.   
     In the end, the $80 million that the UN had promised for AD in Laos never 
materialized, and the government was left without the means to effectively mitigate the 
societal damage caused by the aggressive eradication that they had been persuaded to 
undertake.
201
  The funding that was actually allocated during this period was a grim 
mockery of former grandiose pledges.  In 2005, the North Phongsaly Alternative 








 Chouvy, Opium, 154-156.  Note: Unfortunately, the period of intensive Lao crop 
eradication coincided with the notorious tenure of UNDCP Executive Director Pino 
Arlacchi, who later resigned in disgrace.  In 1999 Arlacchi had promised the Laotian 
government about $80 million in assistance if they would accelerate efforts to suppress 
opium production.  Chouvy points out that this was a truly outlandish pledge, as the 




Development Project received a mere $29,600 to implement programs in 33 villages.
202
  
Across Laos, only about 5 percent of families dependent on the cultivation of opium 
received any AD assistance whatsoever.
203
   
     Consistent lack of international attention and adequate financial support for alternative 
development and rural assistance in Laos fundamentally undercut all contemporary 
efforts to eradicate or otherwise reduce opium cultivation.  Unfortunately, subsequent 
policies undertaken by the Laotian government only served to amplify the damage to 
highland communities and increase the likelihood of resurgent opium production. 
     One such policy employed by the government of Laos in recent years has been the 
forced relocation of tens of thousands of upland Hmong, Akha, and other peoples to more 
accessible lowland areas.  The purpose of this scheme was to eliminate opium production 
and environmental degradation from traditional swidden agriculture in the highlands, and 
connect those people to existing infrastructure and potentially beneficial resources.  
Ultimately, the government wanted to prompt tribal transition from slash-and-burn 
agricultural practice to the raising of cash crops. 
     The result has been disastrous in a variety of ways, with countless thousands displaced 
and dislocated from family, culture, and livelihoods.  Disoriented and impoverished 
transplants have rarely had the knowledge or resources required to obtain sufficient 
inputs for farming cash crops.  At the same time, the government ban on traditional 
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swiddening agriculture has added to heightened levels of food scarcity in rural areas and 




     As Vientiane has attempted to incorporate capitalism in the mode of China under 
Deng Xiaopeng in recent decades, the adoption of policies designed to attract major 
foreign investment have surely further precipitated a return to higher levels of illicit crop 
production in the country.  
     Despite an economy that has had a sustained annual growth of 7-8 percent for many 
years,
205
 poverty and corruption remain rampant in Laos.  In fact, there is evidence that 
such impressive growth has come through the attraction of substantial foreign investment 
with enormous government grants of land concessions for hydropower, mining, forestry, 
and plantations.  This has apparently further destabilized rural populations in many areas, 
endangering water quality and limiting peasant land use for agriculture and other 
sustenance.   
     There has also been forced resettlement of villages from particular areas to make way 
for large-scale resource development such as hydroelectric dam projects.
206
  These trends 
have served to further limit the availability of alternatives to opium cultivation as a 
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survival strategy for growing numbers of destabilized and disenfranchised people in the 
Laotian highlands. 
 
     In summary, since 1975 the misguided Laotian government has made a series of 
decisions that have driven their troubled country into the ground.  These policies include 
forced labor in reeducation camps, mandatory “collectivization” of agriculture, and 
involuntary relocation of tens of thousands of upland villagers.  Their policies have 
driven away most of the educated professional and business classes and kept the country 
undeveloped and impoverished for decades.   
     More recently it seems that the regime in Vientiane is attracting big foreign 
investment dollars and massive natural resource development projects by giving away 
huge chunks of land to facilitate rapid economic growth.  Unfortunately, there is little 
sign that the masses or impoverished rural populations of the country are deriving much 
benefit from this kind of economic development.  To the contrary, accounts indicate that 
these policies are furthering the process of tribal disenfranchisement in the highlands and 
may be influencing a resumption of opium cultivation.  
 
     Although the quantities of opium that are currently being produced in Laos are 
dwarfed by Afghan output, and far below Myanmar, production has jumped several fold 
in recent years.  In 2011, the UNODC reported that opium cultivation increased by 
almost 60 percent from the previous year.
207
  In only two years, from 2009 to 2011, 
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cultivation had leapt from 1,900 to 4,100 Hectares.
208
  Then it spiked again in 2012 by 66 
percent to 6,800 Hectares.
209
  Sources indicate that as many as 38,400 households in Laos 
cultivated poppy fields in 2012, up from as many as 20,000 in 2011
210
. 
     In addition, while increased regional demand continues to drive up opium production, 
recent improvements to regional communication and transportation infrastructures have 




     The case of Laos is important not because of the quantity of drugs that they produce, 
but because after several years of near total suppression reductions could not be 
sustained.  The case of failed Laotian drug control efforts is an instructive contrast to 
enduring Thai success in illicit crop reduction.  Underlying the outcomes in both 
countries are specific environmental factors, policy decisions, ramifications of policy 
sequencing and implementation, and availability of funding for anti-drug programs and 
policies.  As we shift our attention across the ocean to South America and the illicit 
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project a major increase for the year, from as few as 8,300 households in 2011 to 10,200 
households in 2012. 
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 “United Nations says opium production in South East Asia's 'Golden Triangle' up 22 




production of coca and cocaine, we will see a mix of many similar underlying societal 
conditions, drug supply control policies, and related outcomes. 
 
 
                          Chapter 3.  Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production 
                                                     in the Andean Region 
   
     The history of illicit crop cultivation and drug production in South America features 
striking similarities to the history of cultivation and production in Southeast Asia as 
described above.  Similar to opium production in the highlands of the Golden Triangle, 
coca and cocaine production in the Andes mountain region of South America has also 
shifted back and forth between a trio of nations.  Similar to Southeast Asia, illicit crop 
cultivation in Bolivia and Peru has deep roots in centuries-old traditions among 
persecuted and impoverished ethnic minorities.   And like opium and heroin, illicit coca 
and cocaine production has also been facilitated by war and insurgency.  In turn, the drug 
trade has financially supported lingering armed conflict and chaos in several Latin 
American states that have been incapable of maintaining authority over huge swaths of 
undeveloped backcountry within their borders.
212
   
                                                 
212
 Though not studied here in depth, some of the best examples of “narco-insurgency” in 
the Golden Triangle are in Myanmar, where for decades dozens of various rebel groups 
have financed their activities through opium and heroin production and drug trafficking.  
Increasingly in recent years, these same groups have been cranking out truly massive 
quantities of amphetamine pills, triggering an epidemic of amphetamine addiction across 
virtually all of Southeast Asia.  
     Examples of the drug trade financing armed groups, rebel and state-affiliated, in 
Central and South America are numerous and have affected many countries in the region 
including Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru among others.  Both sides in the 




     Finally, as in Southeast Asia, various governments, including the US, have been 
implicated in advancing military and political agendas by exploiting the cocaine trade in 
Latin America.  But also reminiscent of the heroin business in Southeast Asia, most of 
the officials and politicians that have been associated with the cocaine trade in the West 
have appeared to be motivated simply by unchecked mercenary greed.    
     Studying the history and factors surrounding coca and the cocaine trade in South 
America is a bit like gazing into a kind of strange parallel universe where much of the 
portrait appears as a twisted reflection of familiar characteristics and contingencies 
witnessed in Southeast Asia.  But this harsh alternate image of latter-day cocaine 
production in the West appears somewhat more frantic – indeed, wired – than its Eastern 
antecedent, and ever more violent in every way. 
 
     The nation of Peru in South America is the ancestral homeland of the coca plant, 
where indigenous populations have chewed the fresh leaves for centuries, even before the 
Incan empire.
213
  The leaves’ stimulative properties help peasants in the mountains to 
weather the cold temperatures and endure long hours of hard physical labor. 
     Cocaine, a concentrated derivative of coca, was first synthesized in Germany in 1855, 
but only received widespread attention after Dr. Karl Köller’s discovery of the drug as an 
effective local anesthetic in 1884. Interest spread rapidly and within a year cocaine was 
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being used extensively for a variety of medical therapies across the United States and 
Europe.
214
   
     In addition to coca and cocaine use by physicians, coca extracts and cocaine were 
added to an endless variety of tonics, remedies, and cure-alls that were very popular on 
both sides of the Atlantic in the late nineteenth century.  In the US, the legal supply of 
cocaine jumped approximately 700 percent between 1890 and 1902.
215
 
     Peruvian businessmen and industrialists came alive with a jolt to meet the opportunity 
that had suddenly presented itself.  Though some coca was grown in other disparate 
locales such as Taiwan, Okinawa, Nigeria, and Java, by 1900 the majority of the coca 
legally grown for the world market was grown in Peru.  Not only that, but from 1900 to 
1905 Peru was also manufacturing more cocaine than any other nation.
216
  
     But as increasing numbers of people consumed more and more products laced with 
cocaine, a backlash reform movement gathered momentum.  Even before the turn of the 
century, many in the medical community were discussing the adverse effects of 
“cocainism” and pushing for tighter regulation of the drug.
217
  Most US manufacturers of 
popular patent medicines were eventually swayed by bad press and burgeoning reformist 
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sentiment and eliminated coca and cocaine from their recipes even before passage of the 
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.
218
  Tighter commercial regulation of cocaine in the 
United Kingdom followed with the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920. 
     Even though these laws more closely regulated the use and sale of coca and cocaine in 
a reckless commercial market that had been a hazardous free-for-all, they focused 
primarily on retailers, not manufacturers.  With proper labeling, some in the US were 




     Various international drug control treaties regulating coca and cocaine were 
subsequently adopted by the League of Nations prior to World War II, including the Paris 
Convention of 1931.  Before the war the United States had pressured Peru for more 
regulation and restrictions regarding their coca and cocaine production, and after the war 
the Peruvian government soon acquiesced to dominant US and UN demands and began 
actively participating in international anti-drug conferences.  
 
 
     The contemporary cocaine industry in South America got its kick-start with the boom 
of recreational drug use in the US in the 1960s, albeit in a circuitous fashion.  Widespread 
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 Some manufacturers that had limited product lines with a high cocaine content, such 
as “catarrh cure” powders for asthma, resisted regulation.  They continued to sell their 
cocaine-based products well into the 1920s, with a core customer base that was probably 
quite inured to any legally mandated warning labels.  For just one example, the 
manufacturer of “Tucker’s Asthma Specific” was found by the Bureau of Narcotics to 
use just as much cocaine in production in 1926 as fifteen years prior (Spillane, 40).  
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pot smoking among sixties’ youth in the US created a huge and enduring demand for 
marijuana.  By the 1970s US demand was mainly supplied by Mexican producers,
220
 until 
authorities let the hammer drop in Mexico in 1976 with Operation Condor.
221
  The joint 
US-Mexican operation was an unprecedented offensive against Mexican drug producers, 
and a way for the Mexican government to acquire large fleets of US helicopters and 
aircraft, as well as financial aid.  The Mexican government soon used the writ of 
Operation Condor and their new stockpiles of American weaponry to hunt down 
suspected leftists that had formed an armed guerilla movement in the country after the 
1968 massacre in Tlatelolco Plaza in Mexico City.
222
 
     Aside from this “dirty war” that the operation facilitated, and the predictable finale of 
cloudy corruption and resumed drug traffic, Operation Condor is perhaps best 
remembered for suddenly shifting the US marijuana market in a radical way by thrusting 




                                                 
220
 Thoumi refers to an author, Hernando Ruiz-Hernández, who contends that in the late 
60s American traffickers went looking for new marijuana sources.  After arriving in 
Colombia, he says they distributed seeds and booklets to locals who were eager to start 
up marijuana production for export to the US, returning later to purchase and ship the 
crops (Thoumi, Innocent Bystanders, 211). 
 
221
 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York, NY: 
Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 48-49.  Note: This operation is not to be confused with the 
notoriously murderous Operation Condor carried out by right-wing juntas in the greater 
Southern Cone area of South America with CIA backing starting in 1975, although like 
that operation, the Mexicans eventually used the opportunity to hunt down suspected 
leftists and government opponents.   
 
222
 Ibid., 50-51. 
 
223
 Ibid., 49. 
 
 100 
     The Mexicans had killed miles and miles of marijuana crops with Monsanto’s 
Paraquat, but after some of the tainted marijuana was detected in American markets, 
panic appeared to seize the nation and no one wanted to buy pot from Mexico.  The 
Colombians quickly ramped up their marijuana production to pick up the slack, 
supplanting “Acapulco Gold” with “Colombian Gold.”
224
  The Colombian marijuana 
industry thrived as they became the main Latin American producers for the sizable US 
market from 1976 to 1979.
225
  
     The Colombians continued to enjoy a large and profitable share of the market until the 
more potent seedless sin semilla variety became the favorite of consumers in the late 
1970s and 1980s, and major Mexican production resumed in 1989.
226
  But by then, with 
their profits from marijuana lagging, the Colombians had already diversified their 
ventures based on the assets at hand -- well-developed distribution networks, a growing 
diaspora in the US, large regions with weak state presence and negligible law 
enforcement, and a geographical comparative advantage for cocaine production right 
there in the Andes.  In hindsight, the rise of the Colombian cartels seems inevitable.  
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          Whether or not marijuana is a “gateway drug” that often leads to hardcore drug 
abuse has been a hotly debated subject in recent years, but marijuana as a gateway drug 
for the dramatic rise of the Colombian cocaine cartels is beyond dispute.  Success in the 
marijuana business had motivated the Colombians to consider getting involved in the 
cocaine trade years earlier.  Pound for pound, cocaine was much more profitable than pot.   
     By the late seventies, the Colombians had successfully seized the US cocaine business 
from the Cubans who had controlled it for decades.  At this time there was a large 
population of Colombian immigrants that had recently arrived in the United States, which 





     Through the late seventies and eighties Colombian cocaine producers quickly 
expanded their enterprise to keep apace with explosive US consumer demand.  The 
sensational commercial success of cocaine allowed Colombian traffickers and dealers to 
add a much larger markup than on other drugs, reaping unprecedented profits that made 
some of them the first billionaire drug lords.
228
 
     During these decades nearly all of the coca was grown in Peru and Bolivia, though 
most of it was shipped out to Colombia for processing and export as cocaine.
229
  In 1985, 
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for example, only 10 percent or less of the total volume of coca leaf used for cocaine 
production originated in Colombia.
230
  However, a series of robust military operations in 
Peru and Bolivia in the 1980s and 1990s eventually pushed the majority of coca 




     After cocaine set the field aflame across the United States in the late 1970s, and crack 
cocaine hysteria seized the spotlight in the 1980s, Richard Nixon’s “War on Drugs” was 
polished up and recast as Reagan’s “War on Drugs.”  The new drug warriors in 
Washington abandoned the outdated fixation on heroin from the East and refocused their 
sights southward on cocaine.  In the fashion of Operation Condor in Mexico, the drug 
eradication effort soon became highly militarized in South America, as the drug war there 
was moved from the realm of diplomatic pressure and heated rhetoric to a theater of 
bullets and blood.   
     Unfortunately, for many years these costly and controversial US-sponsored forced 
eradication efforts were not accompanied by commensurate alternative development 
initiatives or adequate funding for rural development, leaving many of the primary 
drivers for illicit crop production in place.  As we have seen in Indochina, sustained 
reductions of illicit crop cultivation cannot be achieved by large-scale forced eradication 
and interdiction operations alone.  
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no-fly/shoot down-policy in the coca-growing regions of Peru under Alberto Fujimori 
(Bagley, 102).  The Air Bridge Denial Program (ABD) in Peru ended abruptly in 2001 
after the Peruvians accidently shot down a Cessna carrying a US missionary family, 
killing two. 
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     Among other things, an attendant comprehensive program of rural development that 
improves the lives of poor farmers in remote areas and provides them with viable 
alternatives to growing illegal cash crops must be implemented in order to sustain 
suppressed levels of illegal crops achieved through eradication.  No matter how large and 
aggressive eradication operations may be, without such AD programs forced eradication 
will result in reduced hectarage under illicit cultivation that is like a cancer in a state of 
only temporary remission.  It is a battle victory squandered if it is not accompanied by a 
wise and compassionate overall strategy for winning the war. 
     Meanwhile, in the wake of forceful militarized eradication and interdiction in Bolivia 
and Peru, Colombia assumed the dubious mantle of primary producer in South America 





                                          Colombia: Volatility and Violence 
 
         The nation of Colombia has a historical profile that is unique to South America in 
different ways.  Plainly stated, the unfortunate aspects of its national character that relate 
to illicit crop and drug production involve traits considered conducive to national 
disunity, lesser levels of social capital, violence, and crime. 
      
     Colombia was a hodgepodge collection of quasi-autonomous and mutually belligerent 
cheifdoms when the Spanish arrived in the early sixteenth century.  Unlike the 
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governments of Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and others in the region, 
Colombians were not unified under a central government at the time of conquest and 
remained disjointed under Spanish rule.
233
  These national origins have apparently left a 
thorny legacy to the Colombian collective. 
     Different national regions in Colombia tended to develop autonomously and in 
relative self-sufficiency.
234
  Colombian scholar Francisco Thoumi has written that in 
Colombia, “Regional heterogeneity has resulted in cultural diversity.  Area loyalties are 
strong, and the conformation of a national identity has been slow and incomplete.”
235
   
     In Colombia such low levels of national identification and social cohesion have 
translated into violent regionalism and a general lack of regard for the legitimacy of state 
authority.  This condition has proved a disastrous liability for the Colombian state and 
tragic for Colombian society, with expansive regions of the country that lay beyond 
effective government control.  In recent decades the result has been chaos and violence in 
remote areas hosting bands of armed insurgents and paramilitaries,
236
 along with 
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 The two main leftist rebel groups are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC), and the smaller Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).  The main 
rightwing paramilitary group operating in Colombia was the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC), or the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, officially demobilized 
during the periods of 2004 and 2006 (See: Jeremy McDermott, “Colombia Militaries 
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populations of desperately impoverished peasants.  With little in the way of infrastructure 
or alternatives, the peasants have often grown and harvested coca leaves in order to 
survive. 
     In recent years, a dearth of jobs and economic opportunity, peppered with a sense of 
animosity toward the state and antipathy toward the upper classes, has also driven large 
numbers of Colombian youth from the urban slums to the outskirts to process pasta 
básica or pasta base in toxic makeshift “laboratories.”
237
  
     A pervasively weak sense of national identity and low social cohesion naturally 
produces low levels of social capital in Colombia.  More than one researcher has 
concluded that this results in a lack of “solidarity, reciprocity, and trust” in Colombian 
society, and that, “The ‘bridging’ social capital that links groups to one another has been 
scarce.”
238
  It is proposed that the epidemic levels of crime, violence, and bloody civil 
strife that have historically been experienced in Colombia can be partially explained by 
an unusual lack of social capital in the country.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Disband,” BBC News, August 1, 2005.  Accessed 11-1-14, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4736803.stm).  
     There is evidence that many AUC rearmed and regrouped to pursue various nefarious 
objectives, including to livelihoods in the drug trade.  For example, the Águilas Negras 
(Black Eagles) are a group of new and former paramilitary, some of whom are believed 
to function as intermediaries between Colombian guerillas and international drug cartels. 
(See: “Aguilas Negras,” InSight Crime.  Accessed 11-1-14, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/aguilas-negras). 
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 Note: Pasta base is the crude solvent-laden cocaine sulfate paste that is an 
intermediary step in the production of cocaine hydrochloride, or pure cocaine from raw 
coca leaves.   
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     In a recent year, Colombia was alleged to have been a primary producer of counterfeit 
US and EU currency and counterfeit passports.
239
  The country is also one of the top 
suppliers of Latina prostitutes for the European market, and it is the country with the 
second highest rate of child soldiers.
240
  An estimated 5.7 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) as of December 2013 land Colombia at the top of the list in that 
category.
241
  This number of IDPs amounts to well over 10 percent of the population, and 
it remains a terribly destabilizing force for the government and Colombian society as a 
whole.  Colombia has also hosted the largest number of landmine victims in recent years, 
with an average of three casualties per day in 2005.
242
  Violence, drugs, crime, chaos, 
kidnapping, murder, and assassination have all been synonymous with Colombia in the 
media in recent times.
243
 
     One could take sides in a “chicken-or-the-egg” type of argument concerning what 
started the downward Colombian spiral toward greater and greater criminality and 
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 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Colombia: Internal Displacement in Brief, 










 Note:  Original reference to many of these unfortunate statistics concerning Colombia 
attributed to Francisco Thoumi, Innocent Bystanders, 206.  
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destabilization – the lack of social capital and weak national authority or the infestation 
of the drug trade -- but the results are irrefutable.  They have fed and mutually reinforced 
each other in a continuously vicious cycle, and now one set of these problems cannot be 
significantly diminished without addressing the other.  
 
     Finally, it should be noted that a rigid class structure and exclusive land tenure system 
in Colombian society has not traditionally presented much opportunity for economic 
advancement for large populations of rural peasants or urban slum dwellers.  Francisco 
Thoumi notes that, “Among the Latin American countries with large peasant populations, 
Colombia is the only one that has never had meaningful land reform.”
244
  This 
socioeconomic structure has apparently provided sufficiently low opportunity costs for 
scores of poor Colombians involved in some aspect of the illegal drug trade.  Moreover, 
the limitations on upward economic mobility have fuelled regional and class animosity, 
and further delegitimized state authority.   
     The horrific civil conflict in Colombia during the 1940s and 1950s known as La 
Violencia, has been explained by some as a desperate war fought between would-be 
reformers and elite landowners who were desperate to resist any change in the land tenure 
system or the rigid socioeconomic order in Colombia.  Waged largely in rural areas 
between supporters of the Liberal and the Conservative parties, La Violencia killed 
between 200,000 and 300,000 people in Colombia out of a population of 11 or 12 
million, and spurred mass rural-urban migration to the teeming urban slums.
245
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     The bittersweet end to La Violencia came with a power-sharing settlement between 
the Liberals and Conservatives, in which they agreed to periodically rotate occupation of 
the higher offices and split the distribution of jobs between the two.  In divvying up the 
spoils of public office in this way they were able to end the chronic bloodshed, but they 
left inherent societal inequality intact.  The compromise also created a political 
arrangement that was disconnected and unresponsive to the masses, based on patronage 
and rife with corruption.
246
     
  
     It was from such a milieu that the traffickers from Medellín emerged to challenge 
traditional societal boundaries.  Through the brazenness of their actions and their 
conspicuous display of wealth, they became a heroic inspiration to the thousands of 
youths rotting in the city’s shantytowns who aspired to something better.  Drug lord 
donations to the poor and the sponsoring of community services further endeared them to 
the region’s lower classes, garnering them a Robin Hood-like legitimacy and level of 
allegiance that the state had not earned.  Likewise, Pablo Escobar was beloved for the 
soccer fields that he famously had built for the people in poor neighborhoods, and for 
distributing cash and groceries to those in need.
247
 
     Even more influential than narco largess, the cocaine trade brought scores of new jobs 
to the unemployed masses of Medellín’s slums.  Native Mary Roldán remembers, “Petty 
thievery declined…as the unemployed youth of the city’s surrounding slums found more 
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lucrative work in the emergent drug syndicate – as messengers, bodyguards, mulas 
(human transporters of the drug), assassins, enforcers, gun runners, and distributors.”
248
  
This dynamic highlighted deficiencies in government economic and socioeconomic 
programs, and created popular legitimacy and allegiance for the drug traffickers.
249
   
     Also, like soldiers in an ongoing civil conflict, a booming drug industry tends to create 
large numbers of people with specialized skills that are difficult to translate to legal 
enterprise.  Consequently, once illegal drug production takes root in a society and more 
and more people acquire skills and livelihoods dependent on the industry, it becomes 
very difficult to permanently suppress.  Even if illicit crop cultivation can be reduced and 
drug production disrupted, the know-how and parts of the trafficking network often 
remain intact for long periods of time and are more or less accessible for reactivation 
when the heat blows over.   
     This is why it is so important to accompany eradication campaigns with programs that 
address primary drivers of illicit crop and drug production, like poverty, unemployment, 
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repeatedly found in many drug-producing and drug trafficking areas of the world.  For 
another example, many of the northern state regions of Mexico have not traditionally 
benefitted from good state services provision or plentiful employment opportunities.  In 
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and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas, Fourth Edition, University of Georgia Press, 
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displacement and access to land.  If some of these causes of drug production can be 
mitigated and opportunity costs for growing coca and processing coca básica can be 
significantly raised for large numbers of people involved, then perhaps reductions from 
vigorous eradication and interdiction operations can be sustained.  But without significant 
AD and good governance, eradication and interdiction do nothing to change the long-
term cost/benefit calculus for the poor and desperate people who work in the drug trade.  
These are the same prerequisites and contingencies for improvement in drug supply 
control that were evident in Thailand and Laos, repeated here thousands of miles away in 
Colombia. 
 
     As the drug lords became ever more rich and powerful, they purchased large country 
estates and rural acreage.  In turn, as their real estate holdings expanded to the 
hinterlands, they increasingly came into conflict with greater numbers of peasants and 
migrants who were squatting on the land.  To rectify this situation, the drug lords hired 
their own gunmen and formed paramilitary armies to evict peasants and patrol their 
territories, which sometimes covered areas slated for land reform.  Thoumi identifies this 
process as a “violent land counterreform.”
250
  
     In short order, these troops came up against leftist militias (FARC and ELN) who had 
also staked their claims in the outback.  As a result, the hired guns for the drug lords and 
other landed elite evolved into major military forces (AUC), and the escalated result has 
helped sustain yet another long and disastrous period of civil war and violence for the 
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nation.  Originally the self-appointed purview of the rebel guerillas, brokering and taxing 
coca harvests and the cocaine trade gradually became the main source of revenue for both 
left and rightwing military organizations in Colombia, fueling even more violent 
competition between the groups.
251
 
     The new technologies that the drug lord capitalists implemented in the rural areas 
under their control increased efficiency and put more and more rural laborers out of 
work, making matters worse.  LaMond Tullis describes the ultimate effect as: 
 
          …exacerbating regional violence as people struggle with each other  
          over their “rights” and guerillas and drug-industry paramilitaries  
          jockey for position. From one moment to the next, rural peasants,  
          caught in the middle of the struggle, do not know from whom to buy  
          protection. As a result, industry groups can create a climate of fear  





     The author goes on to say that as coca cultivation rapidly spread through rural 
Colombia, it destabilized and reconfigured social and political structures in the region.  
The thriving coca trade brought waves of new migrants to outback areas that had weak 
and ambiguous property rights, and many of these newcomers were ready and willing to 
use violence to stake their claim.   
     These were lawless and volatile areas, sporadically subject to violent contest.  In this 
power vacuum, leftist guerilla units would sometimes be welcomed as an authority that 
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provided some order and stability in the area.  At other times the guerillas would be 
cursed as dangerous bullies and parasites.  Overall, increased bloodshed, alcohol abuse, 
and prostitution in the backcountry regions continued to weaken the state’s ability to 
govern.
253
   
  Speaking of the problems surrounding weak property rights, Tullis concludes that: 
 
          This is a problem to which the state has not responded adequately, in part 
          because of its historical attachment to regimes of wealth and property  
          inequality. The government’s inability to respond with timely cadastral  
          surveys and land-registration systems has contributed to the sense of  
          governmental illegitimacy, leaving the door open for guerillas and  
          traffickers to settle disputes on their own terms. This lack of order further  





     It was in this environment of roiling chaos that “Plan Colombia” was midwifed.   
 
 
                                                           Plan Colombia 
 
     During the heyday of the Colombian cartels from Medellín and Cali, the vast majority 
of Andean coca came from Peru and Bolivia and was imported into Colombia for 
processing and export as cocaine.  But aggressive US-backed eradication and interdiction 
in Peru and Bolivia in the late 1980s and 1990s incentivized increased coca cultivation in 










  In addition, domestic cultivation was probably better suited to the smaller 
less sophisticated cartelitos, or bandas criminales emergentes (BACRIM), that began to 
pop up and have proliferated widely in Colombia since the dismantling of the majors 
from Medellín and Cali.
256
  By 2000, an estimated 90 percent of Andean coca was grown 




     Plan Colombia was originally conceived in 1999 by the government of President 
Andrés Pastrana Arango as a comprehensive six-year program to improve national 
security and promote social and economic development in Colombia.
258
 It appears that 
over the course of conferring with US government officials about foreign aid for the 
initiative, that Plan Colombia was gradually transformed into a highly militarized high-
dollar war on drugs.  Altogether, the US government spent in excess of $8 billion in 
support of Plan Colombia and associated programs from 2000 to 2011.
259
  
     During those years and up to the present there has been a vigorous campaign of forced 
eradication, both manual eradication (pulling up plants by hand) and aerial spraying of 
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  The violence and alleged human rights violations that have often 
occurred surrounding militarized ground operations,
261
 as well as the toxic contamination 
of people, farmland, and food crops from aerial spraying have made Plan Colombia 
hugely controversial over the years.  Moreover, it is questionable that aerial spraying of 
herbicide has been an effective means of eradication, or that it has been a primary catalyst 
for dramatic reductions in coca cultivation in Colombia despite 1.6 million hectares 
sprayed from 1996 to 2012.
262
  
     In any case, sustaining the otherwise meaningless short-term gains from drastic 
eradication measures requires comprehensive alternative development programs.  
Fortunately, the Colombian government has put much more effort and resources into AD 
alongside their eradication activities in most recent times.    
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on Latin America, October 7, 2013.  Accessed 11-12-14, 
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     For many years, up to 75 percent of US aid for Plan Colombia was allocated to the 
police and military and much less for AD and social welfare for the rural populations in 
those areas that were consistently sprayed with herbicide.
263
  Regardless of these 
shortcomings, it appears that the money spent to bolster law enforcement in the country 
has helped to support substantial reductions in crime, kidnappings, and homicides.
264
 
     Most recently, many of the actions taken by the Colombian government during the 
period of improved security and a dozen years of consistent reductions in coca cultivation 
have been very progressive, following eradication with intensive AD initiatives.  In fact, 
some of the extensive AD architecture and social programs that they have instituted 
during this time have surely contributed to a diminished coca industry in the country as 
well as reductions in crime tangentially associated with drug trafficking.  Similarly, the 
relative calm that has come with increased law and order has allowed the government 
some breathing room to advance peace talks with leftist rebels.  In turn, an enduring end 
to widespread civil conflict is essential to maintaining increased stability and sustaining 




     From 2003 to 2013, alternative development programs initiated by the Colombian 
government are reported to have reached 7,734 areas within 361 municipalities in the 
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country, “benefitting more than 156,000 families that were linked to illicit crops or were 
at risk of cultivating them.”
266
  These programs have involved everything from technical 
assistance with the production of alternative goods such as coffee and cacao, to the 
development of domestic and international marketing and commercial networks.  There 
have also been offerings of cash incentives to abstain from illicit cultivation.
267
 
     One of the main alternative development programs instituted by the Colombian 
government is the Productive Projects Program (PPP).  This program has allegedly 
benefitted tens of thousands of families through 644 alternative livelihood projects by 
613 producer organizations, and affected upwards of 60,000 families during 2012 and 
2013, with substantial investments from Colombian producer organizations.
268
  In 
addition, over half of these organizations are purported to be marketing their products, 
with credit and assets topping 21 billion pesos.
269
 
     Aside from enabling greater government control and increased stability in these 
regions, eradication combined with extensive AD seems to be paying off with steadily 
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 Note: The cash incentives offered through the Forest Ranger Family Program (PFGB) 
have been controversial, like similar incentives that have been offered in Southeast Asia 
and elsewhere.  There is always an inherent risk that some farmers will officially tear out 










reduced coca cultivation that has been sustained for more than a decade, from over 
140,000 hectares in 2001 to just over 40,000 hectares in 2013.
270
  The UNODC reports: 
          During the last decade, Colombia has created an institutional framework,  
          playing a leading role in the implementation of alternative development  
          politics as an effective strategy for the reduction of illicit crop cultivation.  
          This institutional framework is not only reflected in the formulation and  
          application of public politics but also in the strengthening of organizational  
          capacities to promote alternative development with a social, entrepreneurial  





     The report also concludes that: 
 
 
          Alternative development in Colombia has contributed to a sustainable  
          reduction in illicit crops, by implementing sustainable options to replace  
          income from illicit economies. As a consequence, the state has been able to  
          act within vulnerable areas, with a low level of connectivity and problems  
          with violence, improving the quality of life for communities within various  
          regions of the country. This has strengthened the rural economy in  





     These statements appear to be accurate and these developments are very encouraging.  
As AD programs progress they can catalyze and empower a virtuous cycle of positive 
effects for the whole of society that continuously mediate deleterious societal 
phenomena, including some of the main causes of illicit crop cultivation and drug 
production.  AD projects that create better roads and infrastructure to facilitate the 
commercial viability of alternative crops for rural smallholders also enable a greater state 
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capacity for control of remote areas and the promotion of law and order.  In addition, if 
rural areas are given access to commercial markets, as well as access to education, health, 
and other state services, their opportunity costs for joining or assisting insurgent troops 
and drug traffickers steadily increase.  This is an important opportunity for the 
Colombian government to build some sorely needed trust and legitimacy among the rural 
peasantry.   
     There have also been historic advances in ongoing peace talks with the FARC and the 
ELN, including agreements on land reform
273
 and limiting drug production in areas under 
their respective control.
274
  These talks follow the negotiations with the AUC roughly a 
decade earlier, and the somewhat successful demobilization of those forces from 2004-
2006.  
     These developments bode well for Colombian drug supply control, but continued 
success lies down a long and rocky road.   In order to sustain illicit crop reductions and 
keep cocaine production at a minimum, the government must be very successful at 
brokering a peace in the country that will end endemic civil conflict and clear the way for 
them to effectively assert the authority of law and order throughout Colombian territory.   
     This is a tall order in every respect.  No doubt, there are many entities on all sides that 
are profiting handsomely from the Colombian cocaine trade.  These are criminals that can 
only flourish in chaotic areas free from lawful government control, and so may scheme to 
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monkey wrench any peace deal.  In the end, it is a daunting fact that the entirety of 




    In summary, time will tell if the state has made progress sufficient to maintain illicit 
crop reductions and limited drug production in Colombia when new destabilizing shocks 
occur in the future.  In the event of pressure from growing consumer demand in new 
markets for cocaine, a balloon effect from expanded eradication operations in Peru, or a 
failure of the peace talks and resumed conflict in remote areas of the country, adequate 
consolidation of substantial gains made through alternative development programs would 
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 Thoumi, Innocent Bystanders, 207.  Note: Thoumi explains that while the same may 
be said for some other countries in Latin America, what makes Colombia different is that 
these uncontrolled areas are not simply sparsely populated areas of hinterlands, but 
include small urban centers with significant numbers of the citizenry (Thoumi, Innocent 
Bystanders, 245). 
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                                                    Chapter 4.  Conclusion 
 
“That humanity at large will ever be able to dispense with Artificial Paradises seems 
very unlikely.  Most men and women lead lives at the worst so painful, at the best so 
monotonous, poor and limited that the urge to escape, the longing to transcend 
themselves if only for a few moments, is and has always been one of the principal 
appetites of the soul.”
276
 
                                                                                                               Aldous Huxley 
 
 
     Penned by Huxley in 1954, the above passage rings true when considering the wealth 
of evidence confirming the use of some kind of mind-altering “Artificial Paradise” in 
virtually all societies, from antiquity to the contemporary era.  This common yearning of 
humanity to transcend or escape the drudgery of one’s daily existence, combined with the 
extremely addictive quality of modern chemical synthetics and derivatives, and the highly 
efficient systems of trade in the contemporary global marketplace, has created the 
gargantuan multi-billion dollar global drug industry that we have today.    
     Attempting to rein in the beast, the UN and the US took the lead and have dominated 
and driven global anti-drug policy since World War II.  All of the subsequent 
international treaties, conventions, policies and diplomatic initiatives promoted by these 
two entities since that time can be characterized as firmly rooted in the prohibition of 
designated dangerous drugs, including opium and cocaine.  In order to limit the 
availability of these banned substances on the black market, policies, programs, and 
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diplomatic pressure have focused squarely on the “supply side,” or limiting the supply of 
illegal drugs emanating from source countries.   
     As detailed in the foregoing research, over the last several decades supply side 
strategies for control of heroin and cocaine have predominantly focused on the forced 
eradication of illicit crops.  Alternative development programs hold much promise for the 
mitigation of some of the primary drivers of illicit crop cultivation, but have really 
scarcely been given much of a chance in most drug-producing regions.
277
  
     Thailand is a rare case where alternative development was patiently and consistently 
funded at adequate levels over a number of years, with strong political and popular 
support.  The programs that helped the highland tribes in Thailand to develop viable 
alternative livelihoods were buttressed by comprehensive large-scale rural development 
initiatives that made essential improvements in rural infrastructure, health, and education.  
These initiatives enabled the highlanders to connect with the mainstream of Thai society 
for the very first time.  The result has been an insignificant level of poppy cultivation and 
opium production in Thailand for nearly twenty years.
278
   
     The Thai case demonstrates the effectiveness of comprehensive AD programs to better 
the lives of poor farmers and give them viable alternatives to growing illegal drug crops 
in order to support themselves.  This has resulted in the enfranchisement of highland 
tribal families and a crucial alteration of the cost/benefit analysis when considering the 
farming of illicit crops.  It is essential that this calculus be reconfigured in the rural areas 
of countries that produce illicit crops, and the only way to raise the poor farmers’ 
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opportunity costs for illicit cultivation, is through comprehensive AD and rural 
development. 
     In contrast to Thailand, the Laotians have never benefitted from consistently adequate 
funding for AD, meaningful rural development in drug-producing areas, or strong 
political leadership promoting that course of action.  Hamstrung by false promises of 
foreign financial assistance and misguided domestic policies, the Laotian government 
now appears focused on making money through the kind of massive industrial 
development of natural resources that will not create significant domestic employment 
opportunities, but is displacing growing numbers of rural peasants and exacerbating 
insecurity and other causes of illicit crop cultivation.   
     Granted, Laos suffered a horrific and prolonged period of violent conflict during the 
Indochina Wars, and has not benefitted from many years of strong economic growth like 
Thailand.  But if Laos has any chance of stemming the current rises in opium production, 
it must find a way to mitigate the drivers of that production.  Alternative development 
programs can provide those essential tools, as demonstrated in the case of Thailand. 
     But Thailand is unique in the field as the prevailing ideal of alternative development 
and sustained illicit crop reductions.  Unfortunately, the case of Laos is much more 
common.  It is only one of many countries that have ultimately failed to prevent 
resumptions of drug crop cultivation following latent periods of drug production.  
     Can Colombia overcome its chaotic tendencies and the many pitfalls to join Thailand 
in extending its current reductions of illicit cultivation over a period of many years?  If 
Colombia has any chance of joining Thailand in the winner’s circle, it must work hard 
and fast to make big gains in alternative development.        
 123 
     The situation is fraught with contingencies on all sides.  Chaos in the countryside from 
renewed civil conflict or large increases in consumer demand for cocaine from Asia or 
Africa would test Colombia’s endurance in this realm.  But peace, law and order, and 
viably attractive alternatives to producing drug crops are the only things that may keep 
coca harvests in Colombia at currently low levels.  All of these desirable outcomes can 
either be achieved directly, or substantially reinforced by government social programs 
and alternative development projects. 
 
     There is another factor that serves to maintain the poverty, insecurity, and food 
scarcity that regularly underlies illegal crop cultivation:  an absence of secure property 
rights.  Throughout the research presented here we see that in the countries with 
problematic levels of illegal crops, time and again, the rural peasantry has no secure title 
to the land and so is at the mercy of any number of predatory entities and actions.  
Instability and competition with guerillas, AUC forces, drug lord land developers, and 
other desperate squatters keeps large numbers of rural farmers tenuously clinging to 
temporary small plots of land in Colombia, where about 60 percent of coca farmers do 
not possess a land deed.
279
  Similarly, the hill tribes in Laos have been jettisoned about by 
armed conflict, forced relocation projects, and now government enforced industrial 
encroachment.   
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     Throughout the literature cited in my research, food scarcity and food insecurity is 
consistently mentioned as commonly contributing to illicit crop production, but land titles 
and property rights are discussed far less frequently.
280
  
     The consequences that accrue from the absence of legally guaranteed and enforced 
property rights in these countries, when combined with weak state maintenance of 
security and lack of infrastructure in remote areas, has often resulted in the rather sensible 
decision to cultivate the most remunerative cash crop as quickly as possible – coca in 
Colombia, and opium poppy in Laos.  Indeed, in these countries the land holding is often 
too small or infertile to plant sufficient food crops to support one’s family.  Therefore, 
access that is limited to smallholdings or to less arable land on a tenuous or contentious 
basis contributes to food insecurity that influences a decision to grow and harvest 
saleable cash crops in order to buy food and other necessities.
281
 
      In other words, a lack of secure access to decent agricultural landholdings helps keep 
rural peasants and ethnic groups in these countries in a state of food scarcity and food 
insecurity, as well as a state of general insecurity.  Therefore, it can be stated that a lack 
of property rights and equitable systems of land tenure significantly contribute to some of 
the primary drivers of illicit crop production.  Tracing the processes of illicit production 
in Laos and Colombia makes clear that without secure rights to decent landholdings, poor 
rural farmers in these countries are often relegated to the lowliest levels of the drug trade. 
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 For example, Dion and Russler point out that an estimated 60% of Colombian coca is 
grown on smallholdings of less than two hectares, indicating illicit cultivation as a 
survival strategy for those who have limited access to land (Dion and Russler, 
Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and Poverty, 408).  
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     The natural corollary to this realization would be a policy recommendation for these 
countries to work hard to enact fair and just land reform and land registration systems, 
and to enshrine laws protecting private property.  But in much of Latin America this 
would require at least a partial reconfiguration of the traditional elite power structure and 
longstanding wealth distribution systems, something that has historically been at the root 
of countless civil conflicts and wars throughout the region.  Effective enactment and 
implementation of similar reform measures in Southeast Asian drug-producing countries 
would probably require routing significant chunks of corrupted and compromised sectors 
of the state, in order to dramatically reduce the deleterious effects of criminal greed and 
patronage in public affairs and the contracting of foreign investment.   
     As difficult as those undertakings may be, there are currently active land reform 
movements in Colombia
282
 and elsewhere in Latin America, and support for anti-
corruption regimes in many quarters around the world.  To the extent that these 
campaigns are successful, they will buttress anti-drug policy and may help to reduce or 
sustain reductions in illicit cultivation in those nations that are impacted.   
 
     Despite the celebrated downturn in coca production in Colombia, there is evidence 
that recent progress may have been made due to an anomalous easing of market pressure.   
It appears that we are in an unusual period right now – more productive strains of coca 
and more efficient processing methods are apparently keeping world cocaine supply at 
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fairly stable levels, thus making up for coca shortfalls due to eradication and other 
factors.
283
  What’s more, cocaine use has slacked off somewhat in the US and Europe in 
recent years, and while use is growing in other parts of the world, it has yet to 
dramatically surge.  So for the time being, substantial reductions in illicit cultivation are 
not yet triggering a balloon effect, kick-starting coca cultivation in dormant regions.  Peru 
even managed to cut coca output by 17.5 percent last year.
284
 
     But as coca cultivation in South America continues to shrink and the markets for 
cocaine in Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America continue to grow, there will soon 
come a day of reckoning.  History has repeatedly demonstrated that farm gate prices go 
up when market demand for cocaine or heroin reaches a point that outstrips the capacity 
of existing drug production operations.  In turn, these pay raises have always incentivized 
poor rural farmers somewhere to grow coca or opium poppy and cash in.  When new 
consumer demand for cocaine reaches that point in the future, perhaps Colombia will 
have acquired the capacity sustain the pressure from increased drug demand like Thailand 
has.  Perhaps at that time Colombia’s Andean neighbors will have made fewer inroads 
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remedying the poverty and insecurity that drive illicit cultivation, and will therefore be 
dragged into resurgent drug crop production to meet global demand while Colombia 
resists the pressure and stands firm.  Time will tell. 
     It is true that Peru has made some reductions in coca cultivation during this relatively 
relaxed period of drug market transition.  But the Shining Path guerilla group has been 
resurgent in the primitive coca-producing areas of the VRAE for the last several years, 
and they have allegedly redoubled their involvement in cultivation and smuggling of 
coca.
285
   
     The extent to which the respective guerilla groups and militias in Colombia and Peru 
are actively destabilizing the countryside and engaging in the drug trade will help 
determine the path of least resistance for entrepreneurial drug traffickers when new 
markets for cocaine reach the point of critical mass.  When that time comes, the region 
that hosts a kind of enforced lawlessness, with the least amount of state interference or 
control, will likely be saddled with the majority of the new coca fields that must be 
planted and new jungle labs that must be established in order to meet new market 
demand. 
 
     This scenario leads to a final set of questions:  Is it wise to hasten renewed market 
demand with a single-minded pursuit of lower and lower coca yields through eradication?  
Is it ever possible to escape the market mechanisms that appear to have sustained global 
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supplies of cocaine and heroin at stable or periodically elevated levels for decades?
286
  
Would it be better to shift the main focus of anti-drug operations to harm reduction in 
drug-producing regions while working to slowly limit production through alternative 
development, rather than suddenly destroying the crops and livelihoods of scores of 
people, creating instability and potentially dispersing drug crop cultivators, processors, 
traffickers, and other criminal operatives into regions and countries that may be 
thoroughly unprepared, and have fragile institutions that are less resilient?   
     These are worthy questions that were raised during the course of my research, yet an 
in-depth exploration of them stood outside the scope of this paper as defined by my initial 
research question.  However, they are nonetheless very important questions to ponder in 
the context of reevaluating what might make for more humane and effective drug supply 
control policy.  In fact, answering these questions may very well be more important to 
achieving that goal than is the answer to my research question.   
     I believe that this may be true because, as I continued to work on this thesis project 
over the last year, I gradually came to realize that the question of what most influences 
success or failure in illicit crop reduction and drug supply control efforts is premised on 
the implicit presupposition that current anti-drug policy and anti-drug operations, when 
“successful,” are effective in limiting drug production, drug trafficking, and drug use.  
While lasting reductions of illicit cultivation over the course of many years have been 
achieved within the current prohibitionist regime, the reality is that it is much more 
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to meet significant levels of new consumer demand, such as the recent production spikes 
in Southeast Asian opium production to meet new Chinese heroin demand.  This 
phenomenon is driving up annual global supply levels.  It is always fundamentally an 
equation involving supply and demand. 
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common that the simple violent and sporadic forced eradication of drug crops is roundly 
touted by foreign sponsors, domestic governments and militaries, and intergovernmental 
organizations as “successful” drug control.  Through the foregoing examination of the 
subject, I believe that I have demonstrated that this is often not the case.  
 
     There has been a relentless drive for numbers in the drug wars of the last few decades 
that is very apparent in the literature. The annual UNODC World Drug Reports are 
primarily filled with charts and statistics comparing illicit crop cultivation and drug 
production numbers – hectares, tons, and kilograms – from region to region, country to 
country, market to market, year to year.  Many pages are then devoted to analysis and 
theories behind the trends and disparities in the totals.  Increased levels are lamented and 
explained.  Reduced levels are explained and celebrated, nearly always with rosy 
projections for even bigger reductions coming from the particular country’s government.  
The organization and composition of the data and tone of the narration often seem to 
convey the idea that, like points on the scoreboard at a football game, that’s all there is to 
winning -- that winning the war on drugs can be achieved (or at least accurately 
measured) by continuing to destroy more and more hectarage of illicit drug crops.  Once 
again, the research that I have presented here has shown that a winning drug control 
strategy must be far more sophisticated and thoughtful than that. 
 
     Even now, with a greater focus on alternative development within illicit crop 
reduction programs and a general acknowledgement of the essential importance of AD in 
altering root causes of drug crop production, many official entities continue to exhibit an 
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ideologically disconnected drive and enthusiasm for continued forced eradication.
287
  
Despite the near-universal recognition of market forces and the balloon effect that keep 
global drug supply levels relatively stable, and a long record of unsustainable illicit crop 
suppression in the absence of developmental safety nets for rural farmers, the promotion 
of forced eradication continues.  That is to say, forced eradication is still conducted, 
rewarded, and officially celebrated regardless of whether or not viable alternatives exist 
for rural farmers.   
     Perhaps this fixation on eradication is partly the legacy of the no-nonsense, law-and-
order mentality of the drug war and US drug warriors.  It is surely perpetuated by 
posturing foreign officials who are eager to please the US government and get certified 
for successive allotments of money and military hardware.  But a narrow focus on 
statistics and the promotion of eradication target numbers is probably also perpetuated by 
droves of bureaucrats, from the White House to the ONDCP to the DEA to the UNODC, 
motivated to show their superiors and others that they have achieved some progress in 
fighting the illegal drug trade.  The self-perpetuating endurance of bureaucracies and 
bureaucratic processes is well known, and once established, these institutions can develop 
a momentum and internal resilience regardless of whether or not their organization or 
policies are effective or counterproductive.    
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     In closing, it seems logical that the destruction of known coca or opium poppy fields 
would contribute positively to drug control and be a good thing.  This has been the 
underlying premise of prohibitionist drug control policy for many decades.  However, 
though it is counterintuitive, the truth is that the eradication of drug crops without 
thoughtful and thorough AD as a prerequisite is a costly mistake that generally achieves 
no lasting reductions and often counterproductively inflames the very situations that 
promote illegal drug cropping in the first place.   
     Through tracing the processes of drug production and drug control initiatives in 
Thailand, Laos, and Colombia, I have demonstrated the basic circumstantial similarity 
among the three nations regarding endemic factors conducive to illicit crop cultivation 
and illegal drug production, and established an ideal type of drug-producing region.  The 
common variables include insurgency and armed conflict, remote and undeveloped 
territory under limited state control, and populations of impoverished subsistence farmers 
who live with food scarcity or food insecurity and have few viable legal alternatives to 
illicit cultivation.   
     In the course of my research, I also found that a lack of secure and state-enforced 
property rights guaranteeing access to sufficient areas of arable land for adequate and 
steady cultivation of foodstuffs contributed significantly to the incidence of illicit 
cultivation in the three cases presented here.  Although property rights are occasionally 
referred to in the literature and obviously contribute to food insecurity, their absence is 
not consistently identified as a common contributor to illicit crop cultivation.  I believe 
that my research validates the importance of specifically stressing the absence of property 
rights as a common causal determinant of illegal crop production. 
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     By tracing the processes of drug crop cultivation and drug control initiatives in 
Thailand, Laos, and Colombia, and comparatively analyzing those processes and results, 
I have demonstrated the potential effectiveness of alternative development programs to 
address and rectify the underlying causes of illicit crop cultivation.  In other words, by 
showing how alternative development can work to ameliorate the primary drivers of 
illicit crop cultivation, I have identified it as the factor that most influences success or 
failure in illicit crop reduction and drug supply control efforts, thus answering my initial 
research question.  
     By contrast, I have shown that forced eradication, without structural changes achieved 
through some form of AD initiatives, is likely to achieve only temporary reductions in 
drug crop levels and spread pain and suffering that may actually increase the levels of 
illegal production in the future.  Despite ample documentation in support of these 
findings, the forced eradication of illicit crops continues to be undertaken in regions with 
rural populations that have not benefitted from any meaningful development or 
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